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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Utah Code 
Ann., § 78-2a-3(2) (h), and by Rules 3 and 4, of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Petitioner and Appellant, JENNIFER MELISSA THURSTON, 
request this Honorable Court consider upon this appeal the issues 
which follow: 
a. Whether the Sixth Judicial District Court denied the 
due process rights of the Petitioner when it summarily deprived her 
of the right to a hearing and to present evidence? Preserved at R. 
86; Tr. pp. 5-6, 9-10. 
b. Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to 
present evidence upon the issues set forth in the UCCJA, at Section 
78-45c-3, in order to determine whether the basis' of jurisdiction 
in this state exist? Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr. pp. 5-10. 
c. Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to 
present testimony and documentary evidence as to the home state of 
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the children, the best interest of the children, the significant 
connections the children and parents have with the State of Utah, 
and the lack of significant connections with the State of Oregon? 
Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr. pp. 5-10. 
d. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to present 
evidence, testimonial and documentary, upon emergencies, abuse and 
maltreatment of the children and the Petitioner by the Respondent? 
Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr. pp. 8-9. 
e. Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to 
present evidence as to the children's present and future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships? Preserved at R. 
86-88. Tr. pp. 5-10. 
f. Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to 
present evidence that the State of Oregon was without jurisdiction 
over the children and the Petitioner? Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr. 
pp. 5-10. 
g. Whether the Petitioner should have been permitted to 
present evidence that she had not been served with Oregon documents 
giving the State of Oregon jurisdiction, and that no Oregon divorce 
case had ever been filed? Preserved at R. 44, 86-88; Tr. pp. 5-10. 
h. Whether a conversation by the trial court with a 
judicial officer of the State of Oregon should have been made upon 
the record or a contemporaneous record of the conversation with the 
trial court made? Preserved at R. 86-88; Tr. p. 7. 
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i. Should the trial court have made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law upon the issues set forth in the UCCJA, Utah 
Code Annotated, Sections 78-45c-3,4,5,6, and 7. Preserved at R. 86-
88; Tr. p. 8. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review governing the determination of 
each of the issues presented upon this appeal, because no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's rulings on 
questions of law, is the correction of error standard. Liska y. 
Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (UT App. 1995); Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 
( UT App. 19 9 2 ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 8, 1999, Jennifer Thurston and her children 
returned to Sterling, Utah from the State of Oregon. R. 44. 
On March 24, 1999, the Sixth Judicial District Court 
issued an Ex Parte Protective Order granting custody of the parties 
children, Tricia and Christopher, to Jennifer Thurston, restraining 
Ronald Thurston from removing the children from the State of Utah 
and restraining him from inflicting domestic violence and abuse 
upon Jennifer Thurston and her minor children, and ordering him to 
stay away from the children's schools and church in Sterling, Utah. 
R.54-57. 
On April 5, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a Petition for 
Restraining Order to Prevent Abuse under the Oregon Family Abuse 
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Prevention Act, case number 99-1558, before the Circuit Court of 
Lincoln County, Oregon. This Petition has never been served upon 
Jennifer Thurston. R. 83-84; Tr. pp. 6, 7. 
On April 7, 1999, a hearing was held upon Jennifer 
Thurston's Verified Petition for Protective Order in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court for Sanpete County before the Honorable 
David L. Mower. The morning of the hearing Mr. Thurston filed a 
response to Jennifer's Petition for a Protective Order. R. 58-66. 
On April 7, 1999, the Utah District Court entered a 
Protective Order awarding custody of the children to Jennifer 
Thurston, restraining Ronald Thurston from committing abuse or 
domestic violence against Jennifer Thurston and ordering him to 
stay away from the children's schools and church. R. 67-72. 
On May 18, 1999, Mr. Thurston filed a Motion to Vacate 
Protective Order requesting custody of the children. R.73-74. 
On May 28, 1999, a hearing was held before the trial 
court in the protective order proceeding upon Mr. Thurston's Motion 
to Vacate Protective Order. R.75-78. Jennifer Thurston and her 
counsel, and Ronald Thurston appeared at the hearing, and presented 
argument. R. 78. Also, on May 28, 1999, Mr. Thurston had a 
document notorized in Ephraim, Utah, wherein he stated that he 
gives sole custody of the children to Jennifer Thurston. R. 77. 
On June 11, 1999, in the Utah Protective Order proceeding 
the trial court entered an Order Upon Motion to Vacate Protective 
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Order. R.78-80. The order denied the motion to vacate Protective 
Order stating that Jennifer Thurston and the children were 
residents of Sanpete County, the court had exercised it's 
jurisdiciton to protect Jennifer and the children, and that Mr. 
Thurston did not present any evidence to justify the court denying 
Utah's jurisdiction or vacating the protective order, and 
reaffirmed the Protective Order entered April 7, 1999. R. 78-80. 
On June 7, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a Motion to Modify 
the Restraining Order in the Oregon Court, case number 99-1558, the 
case which had never been served upon Jennifer Thurston. R. 121. 
Although Ronald Thurston's original Petition and the 
motion to modify had not been served upon Jennifer Thurston, on 
June 24, 1999, Jennifer Thurston made a special appearance in the 
spouse abuse proceeding in the Oregon Court and challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Oregon Court because she had not been served 
with the Respondent's Petition for Restraining Order to Prevent 
Abuse under the Oregon Family Abuse Prevention Act, ORS 107.701, et 
seq., and as required by ORS 109.724, and 109.754. She also 
challenged the Oregon court's jurisdiction based upon the two prior 
custody orders entered in Utah. R. 121. The children were not 
present in Oregon at the time but had been living in Utah since 
January 8, 1999. R. 44. 
On June 24, 1999, the Oregon judge pro tern, Frederick 
Bennett, modified the unserved restraining order entered in that 
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court on April 5, 1999, to change custody of the children from 
Jennifer Thurston to Ronald Thurstion in violation of ORS 109.727. 
The Oregon Court did not contact the Utah Court. The Oregon court 
ignored the fact that Jennifer Thurston had not been served Ronald 
Thurston's original petition nor the motion to modify his original 
petition. The Oregon court did not take evidence upon the issues of 
the appropriate jurisdiction nor did it enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law upon the question under the UCCJA. Tr. pp. 5-10. 
On July 12, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed a Verified 
Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court for 
Sanpete County within the State of Utah. R.1-7. On July 14, 1999, 
Jennifer Thurston filed her Motion for Order to Show Cause, 
Affidavit of Petitioner and thereupon the trial Court issued it's 
Order to Show Cause, requesting, inter alia, custody of the part.ies 
minor children. R.S-21. 
On August 5, 1999, an Acceptance of Service of Process 
executed by Ronald Thurston was filed with the trial court. R.22. 
On August 6, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a pro se Answer 
to Verified Petition for Divorce. R.27-28. On August 6, 1999, 
Ronald Thurston filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause. R.24-
25. Attached to the Response was an unauthenticated and 
uncertified copy of a Modification of Family Abuse Restraining 
Order of the Oregon court dated June 25, 1999. R.26. This order 
was never and has never been served upon Jennifer Tr. pp. 5-10. 
6 
On August 13, 1999, a hearing was held upon Jennifer 
Thurston's Motion for Order to Show Cause. Jennifer Thurston, 
Ronald Thurston and Kimberly Dunham testified at the hearing. Mr. 
Thurston during the presentation of witnesses requested a 
continuance because he was having chest pains. R.29-31. 
On August 16, 1999, the trial court sent a Notice of 
Scheduling Conference to the parties setting the scheduling 
conference for September 3, 1999. R.32-33. 
On September 3, 1999, a scheduling conference was held by 
the trial court which set the case for trial on November 4, 1999. 
R.34. Ronald Thurston appeared by telephone. A Notice of Domestic 
Trial was sent to Petitioner's counsel and Ronald Thurston, on 
September 3, 1999. R.35-36. 
On October 7, 1999, the Ronald Thurston filed his 
Respondent's Petition to Enforce Visitation. R.37-38. 
Sometime during late October or early November of 1999, 
the Oregon court in the Oregon abuse restraining order proceeding 
contacted the Utah Court. The Utah trial court unilaterally 
cancelled the trial date without explanation to Jennifer Thurston. 
There is nothing in the record indicating that this exparte 
conversation occurred, or when it occurred, or what was considered 
other than the trial court's declaration on December 10, 1999, that 
there had been such a conversation. R. 1-136, Tr. pp. 5-10. 
On November 30, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed her Motion 
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for Declaration of Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act. R.39-40. The motion was supported by the 
Affidavit of Jennifer Thurston, which was accompanied by several 
attachments. R. 41-80. A Notice of Hearing Upon Jurisdiction was 
filed on November 30, 1999, scheduling a hearing in the trial court 
on the motion for December 10, 1999. R. 81-82. 
On December 2, 1999, an unsigned, uncertified and 
unauthenticated copy of an Order of Consolidation from an Oregon 
Court with the purported date of November 12, 1999, was filed in 
the trial court. The order did not bear any Oregon court filing 
stamp, certification nor authentication. R.83-84, 136. 
On December 10, 1999, a hearing was held before the trial 
court upon Jennifer Thurston's Motion for Declaration of 
Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act. R. 85; R.137; Tr. 1-12. 
On February 4, 2000, Ronald Thurston's counsel mailed a 
proposed Order to counsel for Jennifer Thurston. R. 89-91. On 
February 11, 2000, Jennifer Thurston mailed Objections to Proposed 
Order. R. 86-88. 
The Utah trial court entered it's Order declaring that 
the state of Oregon has jurisdiction over the matter and issues and 
dismissed Jennifer Thurston's Verified Petition for Divorce on 
February 22, 2000, in spite of and over the objections of Jennifer 
Thurston. R. 89-91. 
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--- ...... , ll(.)l. 
conclusions of law supporting the Order. R. 89-94. 
On March 14, 2000, Jennifer Thurston timely filed her 
Notice of Appeal. P. 94-97. 
Dissolution of Marriage in the Lincoln County Circuit Court for the 
State of Oregon which has not been served upon Jennifer Thurston. 
D 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
:enn_;_l.e~ ~~•Jrston and Rona.1.-.... Ld..;rs:...on were marr.Le .... on 
the 28th day of January, 1983, in the County of Sanpete within the 
State of Utah. R. 2, 42. 
cr;_;_,Jren as js::;ue o: :_t;e~:::: mbrrlage a: 
Lee, born the 6th day of August, 1983, Trischa Leighanne, born the 
16th day of July, 1985, and Christopher Lyndon, a born the 5th day 
for their entire lives in Sanpete Co~Lty within ~ne State of Utah. 
Ronald Thurston has resided in Sanpete County within the State of 
Utah for most of his entire life. R. 42. 
"' . 
Thurston, intending to retur~ · '~. d . f .o permanent J._ ·i reside ·, 
Sanpete County, Utah, moved to Oregon because the Respondent was 
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offered temporary employment. Prior to moving to Oregon the family 
lived at 251 South Main Street in Sterling, Utah. When the family 
moved to Oregon for the temporary work they did not move their 
furniture, nor most of their clothing and personal effects. R. 42. 
5. The children spent several months, during their stay 
in Oregon, at their home in Sterling, Utah. R. 42. 
6. In October, 1997, Jennifer Thurston and her children 
began packing their few things to return to Sterling, Utah. As 
they were leaving Ronald Thurston attacked Jennifer physically and 
injured her. He struck her with his fists in the and about her 
body. He kicked her several times. He threw her against the walls 
and onto the floor. He took her car keys from her and cut the 
brake lines on her car. Jennifer Thurston was physically forced by 
the Ronald Thurston to stay in Oregon against her will. R. 42. 
7. Ron Thurston physically abused Jennifer on several 
occasions after this in order to compel her to submit to him. He 
would not allow the Petitioner and her children to return home to 
Sterling, Utah, where they maintained their home, furniture and 
personal effects. He made her submit to him by inflicting regular 
physical abuse upon her. He struck and kicked her several times 
each week. He often beat her daily. R. 43. 
8. Beginning in October, 1997, Ronald Thurston began 
druging Jennifer to keep her in Oregon with him. He refused to 
allow her to leave the rented house without him. He threatened to 
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Utah. He pointed a loaded hand aun at her, and put it in her 
rr s0veral occasions durina ~007 
that .Ll sne tried to return home to ,::,L.erJ...Lily, uLctrr, 11e wuuJ..u )',.j_j_j_ 
her The Respondent choked Jennifer several times until she 1ost 
consciousness. 
arque with his new wife, Kimberly Dunham. Mr. Thurston has had two 
(2', children with KlTI~er2 
plurality. i·lL. Inurston hit t.he Petl tioneL .. LI1 the iace Wl U1 i1lS 
fists several times and blackened h()th ()f hPr P\JPC1.. 
Kimber1 y Dun han ' ~lckPrl Jennifer . n r bodv sE::Vel :::. lfnes 
leaving bru1ses all over her. K. 43-44. 
9. On ,:ran11arv r. ~ ggg, Ronald Thurston struck the 
tried to ston him from hittinq and injuring Trischa and he beqan 
,_ t. c: 
father, Gerald Gibb, ana ner sister, Megan, who tooK Jennifer and 
~h~1rl~~~ ~~ ~h-~~ h-~­
_l : ' 
TH- ~h D II II 
10. On Marc.t1 l..:;, J..::.J'::J'::', the Ronalo lllu..Lstull threatened to 
kill the Jennifer on several occasions in Sterling, Utah, and 
threatened ~c take the childH''n from their home i::-1 3tcr1i;-,::;, "+-3t, 
l...v v.Lc'-Jva, vvuc.Lc ;:ce ~as living with Kimbe.r·ly Dunham and their two 
children. R. 44. 
March 24, 1999, LIH::; Jerunfer appl...Led tc :.~1e Sixth 
Judicial District Court of Sanpete County for a Protective Order. 
The Court made findings that the Court had jurisdiction over the 
Jennifer and the children and that they had been physically abused, 
that domestic violence had occurred and thereupon issued a 
Protective Order protecting the Petitioner and her children from 
the violence and abuse the Respondent was inflicting upon them. A 
copy of the Ex Parte Protective Order was attached to the 
Petitioner's Affidavit in support of the motion for declaration of 
jurisdiction as Exhibit A. R. 44-45, 54-57. 
12. On April 7, 1999, a hearing was held upon the 
Jennifer's Petition for a Protective Order before the Sixth 
Judicial District Court. At the hearing on April 7, 1999, the Mr. 
Thurston appeared and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the 
district court by filing a written response to the Verified 
Petition for Protective Order. R. 58-67. In his response he 
consented to follow the orders of the Court and made affirmative 
requests for relief. R. 58-66. At this hearing the Court found that 
it had jurisdiction over Jennifer, Ronald and their children, that 
the Jennifer and the children had been physically abused by the Mr. 
Thurston, and awarded Jennifer custody of the parties' children. R. 
67-72. The Court also restrained Ronald Thurston from inflicting 
further abuse and violence upon Jennifer Thurston and the 
children. R. 67-72. A copy of the answer of Mr. Thurston was 
attached to the Petitioner's Affidavit in support of the motion for 
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declaration of jurisdiction as Exhibit B (R. 58-66), and a copy of 
the Court's Protective Order was attached as Exhibit C. R. 67-72. 
13. On May 18, 1999, Mr. Thurston filed a Motion to 
Vacate Protective Order in the Sixth Judicial District Court and 
his motion was heard on the 28th day of May, 1999. R. 45, 73-76. 
Ronald Thurston personally appeared in court on that day asking for 
affirmative relief. He asked the Court to award him custody of the 
parties children. The Court found that Jennifer Thurston and the 
children had been physically abused by Ron Thurston and that the 
Court had exercised it's jurisdiction to protect Jennifer and the 
children from him. The Court found that Ronald Thurston had not 
presented any evidence whatsoever to justify denying jurisdiction 
or otherwise vacate the Protective Order previously entered and 
denied his requests to vacate the order and award him custody of 
the children. A copy of the Order Upon Motion to Vacate Protective 
Order was attached to the Jennifer Thurston's affidavit in support 
of the motion as Exhibit D. R. 46. 
14. On July 12, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed a Verified 
Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court. No 
divorce proceeding was pending in Oregon, nor has a divorce 
proceeding ever been filed in Oregon. R. 46, Addendum D. On the 
13th day of August, 1999, a hearing was held upon Jennifer 
Thurston's Motion for Order to Show Cause. Mr. Thurston appeared 
personally at the hearing and made requests for affirmative relief, 
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including n request for custody of the parties' children. R. 46. He 
presented evidence and examined witnesses at this evidentiary 
hearing. The Utah Court ordered that Jennifer continue to have 
custody of the minor children. R. 29-31, 46. 
15. Jennifer Thurston's children presently resided with 
her in their home at 251 South Main Street in Sterling, Utah, had 
have since January 8, 1999, and had for at least the eleven (11), 
months preceeding the hearing upon the Motion for Declaration of 
Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act. She and the children live with the children's maternal 
grandparents, Gerald Gibb and Nell Gibb. The children's aunts, 
Megan Gibb and Eileen Christiansen, and the children's cousins, who 
lived with the children during this period and are witnesses in 
this proceeding. R. 47. 
16. The children, Christopher and Trischa, are presently 
and have been enrolled in the Manti Elementary School and Manti 
High School. The children's teachers all reside and work in 
Sanpete County, Utah. Christopher's teachers are Dave Stevens, 
Barbara Eliason, Dale Rice and Cindy Henningsen are teachers at 
Manti Elementary in Sanpete County, Utah. Brennan Jackson, Connie 
Good, and James Peterson are teachers and the Vice Principal and 
Principal at the Manti High School, in Manti, Utah. Christopher's 
scout leader is Arla Otten, who lives and works in Sanpete County, 
Utah. These teachers are witnesses in this proceeding. R. 47. 
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17. The children's doctor is Von Pratt. Dr. Pratt 
1 ' 1 -. 
r' 1 ,.... r r' ~:.~ 
.)...- ........ ..L \o--- ... ~ 
treated them continuously during their lives. The children had not 
received a.ny medical treatment whatsoever lil Oregou. Ihese doctors 
are witnesses in this proceeding. R_ 47-4R. 
18. The children's dE::~ntists c·n·r-; Ernie Larsen, 
Gunnison, Utah, and Dr . .Keeu UILlSt.en.seu, u.L .K__LCllL.Le__Lu, uLai1. u.L. 
Larsen lives and practices dentistry ir1 Sanpete County, 
Christensen lives and practices dentistry in Sevier County, Utah. 
These dentis~s are wi~nesses i~ ~his proceeding. Dr. Lee Thurst0n, 
p::o·\/.lCiL:G ael~L-.:3 ..... -.J __ ... ...I...-_:_'---
- ----I 
for their entire lives prior to treatment by Dr. Larsen and Dr. 
Chr.Lstensen. .Lne cnl.Laren nave no aenLl5L5 lD uregon . .K. qo. 
J9. 'T'rischa, was and is curne>ntJv in therapy with 21 
Utah. Dr. Edgington is a witness in this proceeding. The cn.L__Lurert 
: 3 . 
20. Dianna Robbins and David Lindbloom, of the Division 
Uldt Jennifer Thurston had abused her. children. They c::oncl_,-Jed 
tnat tne Mr. Tnurston's claims were contrived and unsubstantiated. 
These w.Ltnesses work ana reside in Mant~, 
21. The children are Latter Day Saints and their church 
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leaders and counselors reside in Sterling, Utah. The children's 
Bishop is Tim Denton, who lives and works in Sterling, Utah. The 
children's religious leaders have been their clergy for their 
entire lives. R. 48-49. 
22. Jerry Jensen and Jessica Jensen are witnesses in 
this proceeding of the primary care of the children. R. 49. 
23. Sheriff Claude Pickett, Lt. Rick Howe, Deputy Andy 
Lyons, and Deputy John Cox, all of the Sanpete County Sheriff's 
Office are witnesses in this proceeding and all live and work in 
Sanpete County, Utah. R. 49. 
24. Megan Larsen, Zaccary Cox, Devan and Dusty McNiel 
are the children's best friends. These witnesses live and attend 
school in Sanpete County, Utah. R. 49. 
25. Jennifer is and has been the primary caretaker of 
the children during the marriage. She performed all of the 
cleaning of the children's home. She performed all of the cooking 
for the children. She has been the person responsible for the 
feeding, clothing, bathing, education of the children. She has 
provided all of the medical and dental treatment for the children 
when they were in need of treatment. She has taken the children to 
church regularly each Sunday. The witnesses of these facts are 
those individuals named above. R. 49. 
26. Jennifer's grandparents, Helen Gibb and Nell Miller, 
also live in Utah, and they witnesses in this proceeding. Her aunt 
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1r:•n's dunL and uncle, Christina and i'\lfr.:-<ic 
Querido are witnesses 1 r1 this action and resioe l_ll .:>p.r 111y v .L.L.Le, 
27 Ronald Thurston's parent and the rhi1rlrpnfq n~tPrn~l 
Helen res2.a.es '. .,.., 
--C.""I 
witness in this proceedina. R. 50. 
ave any relat_ves 
from his family who reside in the State ot Oregon. His relatives 
reside in Utat, ard Cc1ifornia. 
who have relevant ana rnater:la.L Know.Leuge o1. wtl.LCil u1ey mdy Le~Lj_ly 
in this proceeding. n 
1 G G'l 
extramarital sexual affair Wltl:t L.i.3 girlfrienG., .t~ .... m Dunham. he and 
Kim Dunham have h~d ~wn I?\_ rhilrlrPn 
Jer,nifer be 
wife, Kimberlv Dunham. R. 51. 
30~ Rona :La hurston Kimberly Dunham engage ~ ;-; ::,nd 
have exposea tne cn11aren to lnJurlous nenavlours. ~- ~1. 
31. Mr. Thurston and Kimberly Dunham have physically and 
Cll1U \-llt::; tr.1.a.1. v0Urt 
entered a P rotectl ve Orde.r p.turalJ..L L.1.119 abuse against UH:.; ver,n_;_.r..er 
~nrl thP rhilrlrPn hv Mr_ Thurston and awarded her thP sole rustody 
of ~_rtE! children, lrl::<<. :cJ and ':hristopher on Apr"" ~"l case 
nurr~er 994600040. R. 51-52, 67-74. 
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32. The Office of Recovery Services for the State of 
Utah has assessed and is trying to collect child support for the 
children. Jennifer provides a safe, noncombative, nonabusive, drug 
and alcohol free environment for the children who are in need of 
the stability and guidance which she can provide to them. The 
children desire to live with their mother at their home in 
Sterling, Utah. R. 52. 
33. Mr. Thurston lied in his Petition for Restraining 
Order to Prevent Abuse in Oregon, case number 991558, at question 
8B, when he asserted that there was not another restraining order 
pending between Jennifer and him, nor another case concerning 
custody pending in any other state. At the time he had been served 
with an order of custody, the Exparte Protective Order, from the 
Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete County, Utah, and he was 
aware of the case in Utah. He lied in his Oregon Petition when he 
stated the children were living with him in Oregon, when in fact 
the children were physically living with Jennifer in Sterling, 
Utah. Jennifer Thurston was not served with Mr. Thurston's Oregon 
Petition for Protective Order. R. 52-53. 
34. On July 12, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed a Verified 
Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court for 
Sanpete County, Utah, and Mr. Thurston answered the petition 
requesting affirmative relief. No petition for divorce had been 
filed in the State of Oregon at the time. R. 1-7. 
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er;rLi fer. 1J1UI.::; Lur1 f lled !IE:::! I. 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. R. 39-40, 41-82. 
36. Jennifer appeared at the hearing on the motion on 
December 10, 1999, with her witnesses prepared to present evidence 
of the question of jurisdiction and the best interest of the 
children. Mr. Thurston did not appear at the hearing but was 
represented by his counsel, Lawrence Hunt. No witnesses appeared 
at the hearing on behalf of Mr. Thurston. No divorce proceeding 
had been filed, nor has been filed, in the State of Oregon. R. 85, 
86-88, Tr. pp. 5-10. 
~ou~t declared tha: ,j ~3 c ken ·,v :i t ~ a r. f f ice r c :: the em r ~ 
-, tria~ co;_rt 
evidence, declared Oregon the 4arisdictior summarily disrrcis:=E~d 
3 r . nrucJ r :' 
sut>wltted. e: r .LJ1Ul1H:J. 
Law were not submitted with the proposed Order. R. 89-91. 
39. On February 11, 2000, Jennifer filed her Objections 
to Proposed Order. The objections stated that the trial Court, in 
order to determine whether the bases of jurisdiction in this state 
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exist must receive evidence upon the issues which are set forth ih 
the UCCJA, at section 78-45c-3. The objections stated that 
Jennifer appeared on December 10, 1999, intending to call several 
witnesses to offer testimony upon the basis of jurisdiction 
including the home state of the children at the time of the 
commencement of the proceeding, the best interests of the children, 
and the significant connections the children and parents have with 
the State of Utah, and the lack of significant connections the 
children and the parties have with the State of Oregon. She 
objected that she had present in court several witnesses who would 
have testified as to the children's present and future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships. Jennifer would 
have proved that the State of Oregon was without jurisdiction 
pursuant to the UCCJA, and other facts showing that she had not 
been served Oregon documents giving Oregon jurisdiction, and that 
no Oregon divorce case had ever been filed. R. 86-88. Addendum D. 
Jennifer Thurston objected that any conversation with a 
purported judicial officer of the State of Oregon should have been 
made upon the record and a contemporaneous record of the 
conversation with the trial court made. R. 86-88. 
Jennifer Thurston objected that she should have been 
given the opportunity to be heard and present witnesses and other 
evidence pursuant to UCCJA, sections 78-45c-3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, and 
findings of fact should have been made. She objected that findings 
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of fact should have been made on the factors in determining the 
most convenient forum, the best interests of the children, the home 
state, Mr. Thurston's misconduct, costs and other material factors 
in determining which state has jurisdiction. R. 86-88. 
40. The trial Court entered the Respondent's proposed 
Order on February 22, 2000, despite Jennifer's Objections and 
without allowing her to present her witnesses and evidence and 
without first making findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 
89-91. 
41. Jennifer Thurston filed her Notice of Appeal on 
March 14, 2000. R. 94-96. 
42. Ronald Thurston file his Petition for Dissolution of 
Marriage, case number 001309, in the Lincoln County Circuit Court 
of Oregon on March 20, 2000. Addendum D. The Proof of Service 
indicates that Mr. Thurston's Oregon Petition for Dissolution of 
Marriage was served on Jennifer Thurston on May 3, 2000, by 
Kimberly Dunham, with whom Mr. Thruston lives and has two children. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Ex Parte Protective Order and the Protective 
Order issued by the Utah Court on March 24, 1999, and April 7, 
1999, and the ex parte Restraining Order to Prevent Abuse issued by 
the Oregon Court on April 5, 1999, both issued temporarily to 
protect Jennifer Thurston and her children from abuse by Ronald 
Thurston and awarding custody of the children to Jennifer Thurston, 
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are not determinative of which court ultimately determines the 
question of the custody of the children in a divorce action 
pursuant to the UCCJA. 
An assumption of emergency jurisdiction is an assumption 
of temporary jurisdiction only. It does not confer upon a state 
the authority to make a permanent custody disposition. State in 
Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (UT App. 1990). The Oregon court 
could not have taken jurisdiction under the emergency provision of 
the UCCJA, ORS 109.751(1) (1999). The children were not physically 
present in Oregon. 
The Oregon Court did not contact the Utah Court. The 
Oregon court ignored the fact that Jennifer Thurston had not been 
served Ronald Thurston's original petition nor the motion to modify 
his original petition. The Oregon court, in it's temporary abuse 
proceeding, did not take evidence upon the issues of the 
appropriate jurisdiction nor did it enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law upon the question under the UCCJA. 
The Utah District Court erroneously concluded that it did 
not have jurisdiction in this case. The purpose of the UCCJA, as 
codified in Utah at Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-45c-1 through 
26(1992), is to direct when jurisdiction shall be exercised. Utah 
had jurisdiction under U.C.A. Section 78-45c-3. Addendum C. 
The Utah District Court had jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 
in the case at bar, because the children are physically present in 
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Utah and abuse had occurred, Utah is the home state of the 
children, the best interest of the children is that Utah assume 
jurisdiction, the children and parents have significant connections 
with Utah and substantial evidence concerning their care, 
protection, training, and relationships is present in Utah, and no 
other state would have jurisdiction under the provisions of the 
UCCJA, and did not exercise jurisdiction substantially in 
conformity with the act. U.C.A. 78-45c-3. No divorce case had been 
filed in Oregon. R. 86-88, Tr. pp. 5-10, Addendum D. 
On December 10, 1999, when the trial court refused to 
permit the Petitioner to offer evidence and witnesses regarding the 
basis of jurisdiction in Utah, and the lack of jurisdiction in 
Oregon, it violated the Petitioner's rights of due process. Holm v. 
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992). 
A verbatim record of the communication should have been 
made and Jennifer Thurston should have been permitted notice of the 
proceeding and been permitted to participate in the matter. Holm v. 
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992); Yost v. Johnson, 591 A.2d 
1 7 8 ( Del. 19 91 ) . 
The trial court should have made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law upon all material issues and the failure to so 
make such findings of fact is reversible error and requires remand. 
Kinkella y, Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983); Rules 41 (b), and 
52(a), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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THE OREGON COURT BAD NO JURISDICTION ONDER THE UCCJA 
The standard of review upon the determination of 
jurisdiction is a question of law and the appellate court does not 
defer to the district court but employs a correction of error 
standard. Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (UT App. 1995); Holm v. 
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992). 
The Utah Ex Parte Protective Order and the Protective 
Order issued by the Utah Court on March 24, 1999, and April 7, 
1999, and the Restraining Order to Prevent Abuse issued by the 
Oregon Court on April 5, 1999, both issued temporarily to protect 
Jennifer Thurston and her children from abuse by Ronald Thurston 
and awarding custody of the children to Jennifer Thurston, are not 
determinative of which court ultimately determines the question of 
the custody of the children in a divorce action pursuant to the 
UCCJA. 
An assumption of emergency jurisdiction is an assumption 
of temporary jurisdiction only. It does not confer upon a state 
the authority to make a permanent custody disposition. State in 
Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (UT App. 1990). A temporary 
order, either in the Utah abuse proceeding or in the Oregon abuse 
proceeding, should continue only as long as necessary to determine 
which state should make an initial custody determination. Curtis v. 
Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (UT App. 1990). 
Jennifer Thurston and her children returned to their 
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family home in Sterling, Utah, on January 8, 1999. She and her 
children have resided continuously in Sterling, Utah, since that 
day, have attended their schools, treated by their doctors and 
dentists, attended church, obtained counseling for abuse, and are 
residing in Sterling, Utah, today. 
On June 7, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a Motion to Modify 
the Restraining Order in the Oregon Court, case number 99-1558, the 
case which had never been served upon Jennifer Thurston. 
Although Ronald Thurston's original Petition and the 
motion to modify the temporary abuse custody order had not been 
served upon her, on June 24, 1999, Jennifer Thurston made a special 
appearance in the spouse abuse proceeding in the Oregon Court and 
challenged the jurisdiction of the Oregon Court because she had not 
been served with the Petition for Restraining Order to Prevent 
Abuse under the Oregon Family Abuse Prevention Act nor Mr. 
Thurston's motion to modify his Oregon temporary order to change 
custody of the children from Jennifer to him. She also challenged 
the Oregon court's jurisdiction based upon the two prior custody 
orders entered in Utah. The Oregon court could not have taken 
jurisdiction under the emergency provision of the UCCJA, ORS 
109.751 (1) (1999) Addendum C 1, (the provision is substantively 
identical to U.C.A., section 78-45c-3(1)(c)), which would have 
allowed Oregon to take emergency jurisdiction if: 
(c)) The child is physically present in this state and(i) 
the child has been abondoned or (ii) it is necessary in an 
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~mergency to protect the child because he has been subjected 
to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise 
neglected or dependent. (Emphasis added.) 
The children were not present in Oregon but were 
physically present and had been living exclusively in Utah with 
their mother since January 8, 1999. 
On June 24, 1999, the Oregon judge pro tern, Frederick 
Bennett, modified Mr. Thurston's unserved restraining order entered 
in that court on April 5, 1999, to change custody of the children 
from Jennifer Thurston to Ronald Thurstion, even though the 
children were not physically present in Oregon, and in violation of 
ORS 109.751(4) (1999), requiring immediate communication with the 
Utah court which entered a prior custody order under the UCCJA. 
The Oregon court could not exercise jurisdiction under ORS 109.757, 
because Utah had a prior domestic abuse action. Addendum C 1. 
The Oregon Court did not contact the Utah Court. The 
Oregon court ignored the fact that Jennifer Thurston had not been 
served Ronald Thurston's original petition nor the motion to modify 
his original petition. The Oregon court, in it's temporary abuse 
proceeding, did not take evidence upon the issues of the 
appropriate jurisdiction nor did it enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law upon the question under the UCCJA. 
In Alloway y. Duncan, 996 P.2d 1010 (Or.App. 2000), the 
Court of Appeals of Oregon held that a, "Summons must be served on 
the defending party pursuant to ORCP 7 D, in order for the trial 
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court to acquire personal- jurisdiction." The Oregon appellate 
court further held that, "By force of that authority, personal 
service of an order entered after an action has been commenced was 
not a substitute for service of summons in connection with father's 
original petition for custody as a means to acquire personal 
jurisdiction over mother." Id. at 1012. 
The Court of Appeals of Oregon has repeatedly held that 
the right to receive adequate service of a summons is a 
"substantial right," Bishop v. OBEC Consulting Engineers, 982 P.2d 
25 (1999), and that actual notice of the pendency of an action is 
insufficient to excuse noncompliance with ORCP 7. Mut:phy y. Price, 
886 P.2d 1047 (1994), rev. den. 894 P.2d 468 (1995). The Oregon 
court did not make findings that there was a compelling emergency 
that justifies the extraordinary relief granted by the emergency 
provision of the UCCJA. See, e.g., Gribkoff v. Bedford, 711 P.2d 
176, 178 (Or. 1985). 
UTAH' S JURISDICTION ONDER THE UCCJA 
On July 12, 1999, Jennifer Melissa Thurston filed a 
Verified Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court 
for Sanpete County within the State of Utah. R.l-7. On July 14, 
1999, Jennifer Thurston filed her Motion for Order to Show Cause, 
Affidavit of Petitioner and thereupon the trial Court issued it's 
Order to Show Cause, requesting, inter alia, custody of the parties 
minor children. R.8-21. Jennifer Thurston and her children had 
27 
been residing in Sterling, Utah, for over six (6), months 
immediately preceding the filing of the divorce petition. 
On August 6, 1999, Ronald Thurston filed a pro se Answer 
to Verified Petition for Divorce. R.27-28. On August 6, 1999, 
Ronald Thurston filed a Response to the Order to Show Cause. R.24-
25. Attached was an unauthenticated and uncertified copy of a 
Modification of Family Abuse Restraining Order of the Oregon Court 
dated June 25, 1999. R.26. This order was never and has never been 
served upon Jennifer Thurston, nor has Mr. Thurston's original 
petition and motion for modification. 
On September 3, 1999, a scheduling conference was held by 
the trial court, both Mr. Thurston and counsel for Jennifer 
Thurston appeared, and the Utah divorce action was set for trial on 
November 4, 1999. R.34, 35-36. 
On October 7, 1999, the Ronald Thurston filed, via 
fascimile, his Petition to Enforce Visitation. R.37-38. 
Sometime during late October or early November of 1999, 
the Oregon court in the Oregon abuse restraining order proceeding 
contacted the Utah Court. The Utah trial court unilaterally 
cancelled the divorce trial date without explanation to Jennifer 
Thurston. There is nothing in the record indicating that this 
exparte conversation occurred, or when it occurred, or the facts 
and issues were considered, other than the trial court's 
declaration on December 10, 1999, that there had been such a 
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conversation. Tr. PP. 5-10. 
On November 30, 1999, Jennifer Thurston filed her Motion 
for Declaration of Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act. R.39-40. The motion was supported by the 
Affidavit of Jennifer Thurston. R. 41-80. The Affidavit asserted 
that Jennifer Thurston and her children had lived in Utah since 
January 8, 1999, that Ronald Thurston had physically abused 
Jennifer Thurston and forced her to remain in Oregon by beatings 
and druggings. R. 41-44. It asserted that Utah had exercised 
jurisdiction in a Protective Order proceeding which awarded 
Jennifer custody of the children. The affidavit asserted that 
Ronald Thurston had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the 
court by his affirmative requests for relief. R. 46. The affidavit 
identified the children's teachers, doctors, dentists, counselors, 
clergy, Utah child protective service workers, law enforcement 
officers and other witnesses who reside in Utah and who would offer 
evidence upon the issues of the children's present and future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships. R. 47-50. The 
Affidavit of Jennifer Thurston identified facts concerning the best 
interests of the children, including their primary care and that 
Ronald Thurston had physically abused Jennifer Thurston and the 
children, and was living with Kimberly Dunham, with whom he had two 
(2), other children. R. 49-52. The affidavit asserted Mr. 
Thurston's misconduct by his misrepresentations in the cases R. 52. 
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On December 2, 1999, an unsigned, uncertified and 
unauthenticated copy of an Order of Consolidation from an Oregon 
Court with the purported date of November 12, 1999, was filed in 
the trial Court. The order did not bear any Oregon court filing 
stamp, certification nor authentication. R.83-84. 
On December 10, 1999, a hearing was held before the trial 
court upon Jennifer Thurston's Motion for Declaration of 
Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act. R. 85; R.137; Tr. 1-12. Jennifer Thurston and her children 
had resided continuously in Sterling, Utah, for eleven (11), months 
on December 10, 1999. 
Mr. Thurston was not present at the hearing but was 
represented by his counsel, Mr. Hunt. Tr. p.5. Jennifer Thurston's 
counsel asserted that Jennifer Thurston had not been served any 
such order and that under the UCCJA, she is entitled to present 
evidence as to the jurisdictional questions, the home state of the 
children and the best interest of the children. Tr. p. 5-6. She 
asserted that several witnesses were present prepared to offer 
evidence on the jurisdictional question, and that the court should 
consider the best interests of the children. R. 85; Tr. p.5. The 
Utah divorce court then stated that he had been in contact with the 
judge in Oregon by phone and after due conversation with him the 
conclusion was reached that the appropriate jurisdiction was the 
state of Oregon. R. 85; Tr. p. 6. 
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Jennifer Thurston asserted that she had not been served 
with any documents or motions at all out of Oregon and that she is 
entitled to be heard and present evidence on the question of 
jurisdiction. Tr. p. 7, 9-10. She also asserted that a record 
should be made of any conversation with the Oregon court. Tr. p. 7. 
Jennifer Thurston's counsel asserted that the trial court 
must make specific findings as to the facts that support 
jurisdiction. Tr. p.8. Jennifer Thurston's counsel asserted that 
the children had lived in Utah for nearly one (1), year and that 
the first time the jurisdictional issue was raised was by Jennifer 
Thurston with the present motion. Tr. p. 8. 
Jennifer Thurston's counsel asserted that there was no 
divorce proceeding pending in Oregon whatsoever. Tr. p. 8. 
On February 4, 2000, Ronald Thurston's counsel mailed a 
proposed Order to counsel for Jennifer Thurston. R. 89-91. On 
February 11, 2000, Jennifer Thurston mailed Objections to Proposed 
Order. R. 86-88. She asserted that the trial court must receive 
evidence upon the issues which are set forth in the UCCJA, at 
section 78-45c-3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, and that she had appeared at the 
hearing with several witnesses to offer testimony upon the basis of 
jurisdiction in Utah, care, training, protection and personal 
relationships, the significant connections the children and parents 
have with Utah, and the lack of connections the children and the 
parents have with Oregon, and the physical presence of the children 
31 
in Utah. R. 86, 87, 88. She objected that she would have presented 
evidence that Oregon was without jurisdiction pursuant to the 
UCCJA, and that she had not been served with documents giving 
Oregon jurisdiction, and that no Oregon divorce case had even been 
filed. R. 87. Addendum D. 
Jennifer Thurston objected that any conversation with an 
Oregon judicial officer should have been made upon the record and 
that a contemporaneous record of the conversation with the trial 
court made. R. 87. 
Jennifer Thurston objected that the trial court had not 
made findings of fact and that findings should be made on the 
factors determining the most convenient forum, and costs, and upon 
Ronald Thurston's misconduct. R. 87. 
The Utah trial court entered it's Order declaring that 
the state of Oregon has jurisdiction over the matter and issues and 
dismissed Jennifer Thurston's Verified Petition for Divorce on 
February 22, 2000, in spite of and over the objections of Jennifer 
Thurston. R. 89-91. 
The trial court did not enter findings of fact, nor 
conclusions of law supporting the Order. R. 89-94. 
On March 20, 2000, Ronald Thurston filed a Petition for 
Dissolution of Marriage in the Lincoln County Circuit Court for the 
State of Oregon which had not been served upon Jennifer Thurston. 
R. 117; Addendum D. 
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The Utah District Court erroneously concluded that it did 
not have jurisdiction in this case. The purpose of the UCCJA, as 
codified in Utah at Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-45c-1 through 
26(1992), is to direct when jurisdiction shall be exercised. Utah 
had jurisdiction under U.C.A. Section 78-45c-3. Addendum C. 
The Utah District Court had jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 
in the case at bar, because Jennifer Thurston and the children had 
resided continuously in Utah since January 8, 1999, a period in 
excess of six (6), months prior to the commencement of the divorce 
action on July 12, 1999. U.C.A. 78-45c-3(1} (a} (i}. The children 
had continuously in Utah at the time of the commencement of the 
divorce proceeding and thus, the "home state" jurisdictional basis 
had been met. R. 1, 44. 
The Utah trial court also had jurisdiction under 
subsection (b), of U.C.A. 78-45c-3, because it is in the best 
interest of the children that the Utah court assume jurisdiction 
because the children and their parents, Jennifer Thurston and 
Ronald Thurston, have a significant connection with Utah, and there 
is available in Utah substantial evidence concerning the children's 
present or future 
relationships. The 
evidence concerning 
care, protection, training, 
significant connections and 
the children's present and 
and personal 
substantial 
future care, 
protection, training and personal relationships was shown by 
Jennifer Thurston's Affidavit in support of her motion for 
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declaration of jurisdiction. R. 41-80. 
Thirdly, the Utah court had jurisdiction under subsection 
(c), of U.C.A. 78-45c-3, because the Thurston children were 
physically present in Utah, and it was necessary in an emergency to 
protect the children because they had been subjected to or 
threatened with mistreatment or abuse or were otherewise neglected 
or dependent. R. 54-57. The Utah District Court had entered an Ex 
Parte Protective Order in case number 994600040, restraining Ronald 
Thurston from attemmpting, committing or threatening domestic 
violence and abuse against the children, ordered him to stay away 
from the children's home, schools and church in Sterling, Utah, and 
had prohibited him from removing the children from the state of 
Utah. R. 54-57. 
Lastly, based upon the record before the trial court on 
December 10, 1999, and on February 22, 2000, it appeared that no 
other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with subsections (a), (b), or (c), and 
it was in the best interest of the children that Utah assume 
jurisdiction. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992). 
Clearly, the Utah court had jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 
section 78-45c-3. While the court may have eventually declined to 
exercise jurisdiction, it was error to do so without permitting 
Jennifer Thurston a hearing as to Utah's jurisdiction and Oregon's 
lack of jurisdiction. Jennifer Thurston asserted that she had not 
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been served Oregon process and she should have been permitted to 
present her proof of failure of service under UCCJA, section 78-
45c-5. A foreign judgment entered without jurisdiction and without 
proper service of process is void and need not be accorded full 
faith and credit. See, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 99 (Utah 
1986). Moreover, U.C.A. Section 78-45c-4, provides that prior to 
making a decree under the UCCJA, reasonable notice and opportunity 
to be heard shall be given to the contestants. 
On December 10, 1999, at the time of the hearing on the 
motion for declaration of jurisdiction, 
document the trial court had before 
the only Oregon court 
it was the Order of 
Consolidation filed in the trial court on December 2, 1999. R. 83-
84. This purported order did not make findings as to the 
jurisdictional prerequisites of sections 78-45c-3, 4, 5, 6, or 7. 
This purported order was unsigned, uncertified~ unauthenticated and 
not domesticated by it's filing under the Utah Foreign Judgment 
Act, U.C.A. Section 78-22a-2(1) (1992). R. 136. Holm v. Smilowitz, 
840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 1992). 
Moreover, on December 10, 1999, the date of the hearing 
on Jennifer Thurston's motion pursuant to the UCCJA, and on 
February 22, 2000, the date of the court's Order transferring 
jurisdiction to Oregon and dismissing Jennifer Thurston's divorce 
petition, there was no divorce proceeding pending in the state of 
Oregon. R. 46, 87; Tr. p. 8; Addendum D. 
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The Utah court in this divorce action cannot transfer 
jurisdiction to the Oregon temporary restraining order to prevent 
abuse action, to make an ultimate determination of custody of the 
Thurston children when no dissolution proceeding was pending in 
Oregon. The only dissolution action pending in either state was in 
Jennifer Thurston's Verified Petition for Divorce in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court which was filed at the time when the 
Jennifer Thurston and her children had been in Utah for in excess 
of six (6), months. Utah was the home state of the children at the 
time of the commencement of the divorce action in Utah. 
U.C.A. Section 78-45c-6(1), directs that, 
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the petition 
a proceeding concerning custody of the child was pending in a court 
of another state exercJsJng jurisdiction substantially in 
conformity with this act .... {Emphasis added.) 
Utah was the home state of the children at the time of 
the commencement of the proceeding in Utah since the children had 
lived in Sterling, Utah, for a period of in excess of six (6), 
consecutive months. Thus, Oregon could not assert jurisdiction 
under ORS 109.74l{l){a), it's "home state" provision which is 
identical to U.C.A. 78-45c-3(1) (a). 
Similarly, the Oregon court could not exercise 
jurisdiction based upon the record in the trial court under ORS 
109.741{1) (b), substantially identical to U.C.A. 78-45c-3(1) (b). 
There was no showing in the trial court that it was in the best 
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interest of the children that Oregon assume jurisdiction because 
the children and parents have a significant connection with Oregon, 
and that there is available in Oregon substantial evidence 
concerning the children's present or future care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships. The only evidence of the 
children's best interest and evidence concerning their care, 
protection, training and personal relationships in the trial court 
was that of Jennifer Thurston in her affidavit in support of her 
motion to declare Utah the jurisdiction to determine custody. R. 
39-60. 
Moreover, Oregon was not exercising jurisdiction 
substantially in conformity with the UCCJA. Jennifer Thurston had 
not been served any petition, nor order, from an Oregon court in 
the temporary restraining order proceeding of Ronald Thurston. 
This failure of service of process was violative of UCCJA, Sections 
78-45c-4, and 78-45c-5, and ORS 109.724, and 109.754. 
In Alloway v. Duncan, 996 P.2d 1010 (Or.App. 2000), the 
Court of Appeals of Oregon held that a, "Summons must be served on 
the defending party pursuant to ORCP 7 D, in order for the trial 
court to acquire personal jurisdiction,"... and, " ... personal 
service of an order entered after an action has been commenced was 
not a substitute for service of summons in connection with father's 
original petition for custody as a means to acquire personal 
jurisdiction over mother." Id. at 1012. 
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In order to entertain a dispute a court must have 
jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the dispute and the 
individuals involved. If a court lacks either type of jurisdiction 
it has no power to entertain the suit. Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 
717 (UT App. 1990). Oregon had not exercised jurisdiction 
substantially in conformity with the UCCJA, because Jennifer 
Thurston had not been served with any Oregon petitions or orders. 
The Utah trial court, should have taken jurisdiction of the custody 
determination because no other action for dissolution of the 
marriage and concerning the custody of the children was pending in 
another state on December 10, 1000, and on February 22, 2000, the 
date of entry of the Order declaring that Oregon had jurisdiction 
and dismissing Jennifer Thurston's divorce petition. Ronald 
Thurston did not filed his Petition for Dissolution in the Oregon 
court until March 20, 2000. Addendum D. 
THE PETITIONER' S RIGHT OF DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT' S FAILURE TO PERMIT HER A BEAlUNG 
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THE FACTORS DETERMIN:ING JORISDICTION 
Jennifer Thurston's right of due process was violated by 
the trial court's failure to permit her a hearing to present 
evidence on the factors determining jurisdiction. 
On July 12, 1999, the Jennifer Thurston filed her 
Verified Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court 
for Sanpete County within the State of Utah, and Ronald Thurston 
answered the petition requesting affirmative relief. No petition 
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for divorce had been filed in the State of Oregon at the time. R. 
86-88; Addendum D. 
On November 30, 1999, the Jennifer Thurston filed her 
Motion for Declaration of Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The motion was supported by the 
Affidavit of Jennifer Thurston. 
Jennifer Thurston appeared at the hearing on the motion 
on December 10, 1999, with her witnesses prepared to present 
evidence of the question of jurisdiction and the best interest of 
the children. Ronald Thurston did not appear at the hearing but 
was represented by his counsel, Lawrence Hunt. No witnesses 
appeared at the hearing on behalf of Mr. Thurston. No divorce 
proceeding had been filed in the State of Oregon. Mr. Thurston's 
Petition for Dissolution was filed in the Lincoln County Circuit 
Court in Oregon on March 20, 2000. Addendum D. 
Jennifer Thurston attempted to call witnesses. The trial 
Court declared that it had spoken with an officer of the Court of 
the State of Oregon. Tr. pp. 5-10. No record had been made of the 
conversation between the Utah Court and the Oregon Court. R. 1-136. 
The trial Court refused to allow Jennifer Thurston to present 
witnesses and evidence, declared that Oregon had jurisdiction and 
summarily dismissed Jennifer Thurston's divorce action. R. 89-91. 
On February 4, 2000, the Respondent's counsel submitted 
a proposed Order. R. 89-91. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law were not submitted with the proposed Order nor entered by the 
trial court. R. 1-136. 
On February 11, 2000, Jennifer Thurston filed her 
Objections to Proposed Order. R. 86. The objections stated that 
the trial Court, in order to determine whether the bases of 
jurisdiction in this state exist must receive evidence upon the 
issues which are set forth in the UCCJA, at section 78-45c-3. R. 
86-88. 
Jennifer Thurston had appeared at the hearing on December 
10, 1999, intending to call several witnesses to offer testimony 
upon the basis of jurisdiction including the home state of the 
children at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, the 
best interests of the children, and the significant connections the 
children and parents have with the State of Utah, and the lack of 
significant connections the children and the parties have with the 
State of Oregon. She was prepared to offer witnesses and testimony 
that the children were physically present in this state and the 
facts showing emergencies, abuse and maltreatment of the children 
and the Petitioner by Ronald Thurston. Jennifer Thurston had 
present in court several witnesses who would have testified as to 
the children's present and future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships. She would have proved that Oregon was 
without jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA, and other facts showing 
that she had not been served Oregon documents giving Oregon 
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jurisdiction, and that no Oregon divorce case had ever been filed. 
R. 86-88. 
She objected that the trial court had jurisdiction over 
the parties and could not dismiss the divorce action because the 
she and the children had been residents of Sanpete County within 
the State of Utah for over six (6}, months at the time the divorce 
proceeding was filed and that no divorce proceeding was pending in 
Oregon. R. 86-88. 
Jennifer Thurston objected that she should have been 
given the opportunity to be heard and present witnesses and other 
evidence pursuant to UCCJA, sections 78-45c-4 and 5, and findings 
of fact should have been made. R. 86-88. She objected that 
findings of fact should have been made on the factors in 
determining the most convenient forum, the best interests of the 
children, the horne state, the Respondent's misconduct, costs and 
other material factors in determining which state has jurisdiction. 
R. 86-88. 
The trial Court executed and entered the Respondent's 
proposed Order on February 22, 2000, despite the Petitioner's 
objections and without allowing the Petitioner to present her 
witnesses and evidence and without first making findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. R. 89-91. 
"The demands of due process rest on the concept of basic 
fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the 
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case and just to the parties involved." Wiscombe v .. Wiscoffibe, 7 4·4 
P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Rupp v. Grantsville City, 
610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)). ~one of the fundamental requisites 
of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard." 
A foreign judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the 
Petitioner, and without proper service of process should not be 
accorded full faith nor credit in Utah. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 
96, 99 (Utah 1986) . The Petitioner, if permitted a hearing upon 
jurisdiction, would have proved that she had never been served with 
Oregon process and that no divorce petition had been filed or was 
pending in the State of Oregon on December 10, 1999, nor on 
February 22, 2000, nor on March 14, 2000. R. 89, 95, 134, 136. 
Ronald Thurston's divorce action was filed in the Lincoln 
County Circuit Court, in Oregon on March 20, 2000, as case number 
001309. See, Addendum D (Ronald Thurston's Petition for Dissolution 
of Marriage) . The Utah trial court could not, on December 10, 
1999, nor on February 22, 2000, transfer jurisdiction over the 
divorce and custody pxoceeding to a non-existent dissolution 
proceeding in Oregon. 
If the trial court had permitted Jennifer Thurston to 
call witnesses and present evidence she would have called the 
witnesses named in her affidavit filed in support of her motion and 
these witnesses would have testifed as to the facts supporting the 
jurisdictional basis' in Utah. Ronald Thurston was not present at 
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the hearing personally, but appeared by his counsel. No witnesses 
were present on behalf of Mr. Thurston and the facts which would 
have been produced by Jennifer Thurston, as set forth in her 
affidavit in support of the motion, were uncontroverted. 
On December 10, 1999, when the trial court refused to 
permit the Petitioner to offer evidence and witnesses regarding the 
basis of jurisdiction in Utah, and the lack of jurisdiction in 
Oregon, it violated the Petitioner's rights of due process. Holm v. 
Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992}. 
Jennifer Thurston challenges, and challenged below, the 
jurisdiction of the State of Oregon over her and the children. She 
has challenged Oregon's in personam jurisdiction and Oregon's 
subject matter jurisdiction. Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (UT 
App. 1990}. She should be permitted to present her witnesses and 
evidence showing the failure of service of process and the proper 
forum. Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Order declaring jurisdiction in Oregon and dismissing 
the Utah divorce action was plain and manifest error. The Order 
should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to permit the Petitioner to present 
evidence upon the basis of jurisdiction set forth in the UCCJA. 
THE FAILURE TO MAKE A RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION 
BE'lWEEN THE OREGON COURT AND THE UTAH COURT IS ERROR 
On July 12, 1999, the Petitioner filed her Verified 
Petition for Divorce in the Sixth Judicial District Court for 
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Sanpete County within the State of Utah, and the Respondent 
answered the petition requesting affirmative relief. No petition 
for divorce had been filed in the State of Oregon at the time. 
Addendum D. 
On November 30, 1999, the Petitioner filed her Motion for 
Declaration of Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act which was supported by her affidavit showing the 
best interest of the children, their home state, facts regarding 
emergency jurisdiction, failure of service of process, identifying 
witnesses, abuse by Ronald Thurston, the significant connections 
the children and parents have with the State of Utah, and 
substantial evidence concerning the children's present and future 
care, protection, training and personal relationships, and the 
convenience of forum. R. 41-80. 
Sometime during late October or early November of 1999, 
the Oregon court in it's restraining order proceeding contacted the 
Utah Court. The Utah trial court unilaterally cancelled the trial 
date without explanation to Jennifer Thurston. There is nothing in 
the record indicating that this exparte conversation occurred, or 
when it occurred, or what was considered other than the trial 
court's declaration on December 10, 1999, that there had been such 
a conversation. Tr. pp. 5-10. 
The Petitioner appeared at the hearing on the motion on 
December 10, 1999, with her witnesses prepared to present evidence 
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of th·e question of juri-sdiction and the best interest of the 
children, their training, care, protection and the significant 
connections with Utah. The Respondent did not appear at the 
hearing but was represented by his counsel, Lawrence Hunt. No 
witnesses appeared at the hearing on behalf of the Respondent. No 
divorce proceeding had been filed, nor has been filed, in the State 
of Oregon. R. 85, 86-89. 
The Petitioner attempted to call witnesses. The trial 
Court refused to permit evidence and declared that it had spoken 
with an officer of the Court of the State of Oregon and that 
jurisdiction had been determined to be in Oregon. Tr. pp. 5-10. 
In State ex rel. D.S.K. v. Kasper, 792 P.2d 118 (UT App. 
1990), this Court recognized the importance of at least a 
contemporaneous written record of the communication between two 
courts concerning the determination of jurisdiction by either court 
under the UCCJA. Id. at 127 n. 9. Without a record of the 
proceeding it is impossible for an appellate court to review the 
discussion between the Oregon court and the Utah court. The 
appellate court nor Jennifer Thurston know the factors, evidence 
and reasoning used by the two courts to make a jurisdictional 
determination. Briggs v. Holcqmb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (UT App. 1987). 
A verbatim record of the communication should have been 
made and Jennifer Thurston should have been permitted notice of the 
proceeding and been permitted to participate in the matter. Yost v. 
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Johnson, 591 A.2d 178 {De-l, 19.'H) . The scheduling and notice of a 
hearing between courts and parties is not burdensome. 
Jennifer Thurston was prejudiced by the denial of the 
opportunity to prove to either court that she had not been served 
with Mr. Thurston's Oregon petition and Restraining Order. She was 
prejudiced because she was denied the opportunity to offer evidence 
of the most convenient forum, the home state of the children, the 
best interest of the children, and the unclean hands of Mr. 
Thurston. See, e.g., Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (UT App. 
1992), quoting Wyatt v. Falhsing, 396 So.2d 1069 (Ala.Civ. App. 
1981), finding a denial of due process because the mother was not 
given notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
"Ordinarily, the record consists of a verbatim 
transcription or recording of the entire proceeding." Liska v. 
Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (UT App. 1995). See Utah Code Ann. Section 78-
56-1.1 (1992); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R3-304(3) (A). 
It is impossible for an appellate court to review the 
action of the trial court, and the basis for conclusions as to 
which state has jurisdiction, the best interest of the children and 
which forum is most appropriate, without any record of the 
proceedings in the trial court. See Briggs y. Holcoffib, 740 P.2d 
281, 283 (UT App. 1987). 
In the instant action there is no indication in the 
record of when, or if, there was a conversation between an Oregon 
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judicial officer and the district court. Jennifer Thurson and the 
appellate court can only guess when the communication occured, 
what the substance of the communication was, and the factors relied 
upon by the trial court for making it's determination that Oregon 
is the more appropriate forum, and the basis for jurisdiction. 
Jennifer Thurston and this appellate Court are prevented from 
determining and reviewing the facts and conclusions upon which the 
action transferring jurisdiction to Oregon was based. 
The Order transferring jurisdiction to the State of 
Oregon and dismissing the Utah divorce action was manifest error. 
The Order should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to 
the trial court with instructions to permit Jennifer Thurston to 
present testimony and evidence upon the basis of jurisdiction set 
forth in the UCCJA, that any communication between an Oregon 
judicial officer and the Utah court be upon the record, and that 
the Petitioner should have notice of the communication and be 
permitted to participate in the communication. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE MADE 
FDmiNGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The trial court should have made factual findings and 
conclusions of law upon the basis' of jurisdiction in the State of 
Utah in accordance with Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-45c-3, and 
the factors used in determining the most convenient forum, or 
declining jurisdiction on findings of inconvenient forum, pursuant 
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to Section 78-45c-7. The failure of the trial court to make such 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the dismissal of the 
divorce action is plain and manifest error. U.C.A. section 78-
45c-7(1), and (2), specifically provides that the trial court must 
make findings regarding the convenience of forum, and the most 
appropriate forum. Addendum C 2. 
Moreover, under U.C.A. section 78-45c-7(3), in 
determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall 
consider if it is in the interest of the children that another 
state assume jurisdiction, taking into account, inter alia, the 
home state of the children, the connection of another state with 
the children and their family and the contestants, whether 
substantial evidence concerning the children's present or future 
care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more 
readily available in another state, any agreement upon another 
forum which is no less appropriate, and whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the court of this state would contravene any of the 
purposes stated in U.C.A. section 78-45c-1. Jennifer Thurston 
objected that the trial court had failed to make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law regarding jurisdiction. R. 86-88. 
The appellate court, without adequate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, has no ability to review the basis for the 
trial court to find that Utah was without jurisdiction, that Oregon 
had jurisdicition, and the factors used in determining the most 
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convenient forum. 
The only evidence before the trial court on December 10, 
1999, was that of Jennifer Thurston. In Kelly v. Draney, 754 P.2d 
92 (UT App. 1988), this Court quoted the Utah Supreme Court in 
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 396 (Utah 1987), when it stated, 
"Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material issues 
is reversible error unless the facts in the record are 'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment.' [Such findings] 'should be sufficiently detiled 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" See 
also, Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983) requiring 
reversal and remand. 
The failure of the trial court to make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law supporting it's judgment was plain, manifest 
and reversible error. This action should be remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to enter findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, based upon the affidavit of Jennifer Thurston, and judgment 
that the State of Utah has jurisdiction upon said facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Oregon court was without jurisdiction to enter a 
permanent custody order. Utah has jurisdiction pursuant to the 
UCCJA, 78-45c-1, et seq. Jennifer Thurston should be permitted to 
present evidence. Any communication between the Oregon Court and 
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the Utah court should bPr upon the record and notice and opportunity 
to be heard provided Jennifer Thurston. The trial court should 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law upon the facts and 
issues required under the UCCJA. This matter should be reversed 
eptember, 2000. 
t, 
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I hereby certify that on this 21st day of September, 2000, I 
served upon and mailed, postag 
two (2), true and correct c 
Appellant to Ronald Thurston, at 
97303. 
/ 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Order declaring Oregon's jurisdiction on February 22, 1999. 
B. Transcript of hearing on jurisdiction on December 10, 1999. 
C. 1. Oregon UCCJA, ORS 109.701 et seq. 
2. Utah UCCJA, U.C.A. 78-45c-3 et seq. 
D. Ronald Thurston's Oregon Petition for Dissolution filed March 
20, 2000, in Lincoln County Circuit Court, case number 001309, 
Return of Service by Kimberly Dunham of May 3, 2000. 
Minutes of June 5, 2000, hearing. 
LAWRENCE H. HUNT (3934) 
Attorney for Respondent 
195 North 100 East, Suite 205 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
( 435) 896-4424 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER MELISSA THURSTON, 
ORDER 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
RONALD THURSTON, Civil No. 994600102 
Respondent. JUDGE LOUIS G. TERVORT 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 1Oth day of 
December, 1999, upon the Motion of the Petitioner seeking a declaration of jurisdiction 
pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The Petitioner appearing in person 
and being represented by her attorney, Andrew B. Berry, Jr., and the Respondent appearing 
in person and being represented by his attorney, Lawrence H. Hunt. The court having heard 
argument by counsel for the parties, having had conversation with the Court in the State of 
Oregon, and the above-entitled Court being fully advised in the premises, now makes the 
following Order: 
Thurston vs. Thurston 
Order 
Civil No. 994600102 
Page2 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. The State of Oregon has jurisdiction over this matter and all issues therein. 
2. The Court hereby dismisses all matters concerning the above-entitled action. 
DATED this I 5{ day of February, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this !:\:l:h day of February, 2000. 
Andrew B. Berry 
Attorney at Law 
62 West Main Street 
P.O. Box 600 
Moroni, Utah 84646-0600 
NOTICE 
The above referenced parties will PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Rule 4-
504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, the undersigned will submit the foregoing 
to the Judge of the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete County for signature upon the 
expiration of five (5) days from the date of mailing of this Notice unless a written objection 
is filed with the Court and Counsel for the Respondent prior to that time. Please govern 
yourself accordingly. 
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10:00 A.M. 
lOTH DECEMBER 1999 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
MR. HUNT: The only--I'm on the Thurston matter, 
4 too, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Oh, good. Stay here. 
6 MR. HUNT: (Inaudible) . 
7 THE COURT: Let's take that up right now,--
8 MR. HUNT: Okay, 
9 THE COURT: --if you have no objection. 
10 MR. HUNT: (Inaudible)--Andrew Berry. 
11 THE COURT: Mr. Berry. Is he still involved in 
12 that? 
13 MR. HUNT: Ah, the last I heard. 
14 THE COURT: He indicated you were in it. 
15 MR. HUNT: I haven't got an appearance filed yet. I 
16 just recently got--(Inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: I thought we had an order out of Oregon 
18 that they have jurisdiction in this matter. 
19 MR. HUNT: You do. There is. 
20 THE COURT: So why are we here? 
21 MR. HUNT: An interesting question. I didn't 
22 schedule the hearing, Judge. 
23 THE COURT: You--ha-ha, ha-ha, ha. 
24 MR. HUNT: You know me. I'm always innocent. Just 
25 ask me. It's never my fault. "Honest, Dear. " Ha-ha, ha-ha, 
1 
2 
3 
ha. 
(Mr. Berry entered courtroom.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Be~ry, are you involved in the 
4 Thurston matter any longer? 
5 MR. BERRY: Oh, of course. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Oh, you represent Melissa. 
7 That's right. And you represent--
8 
9 
MR. HUNT: Ron Thurston. 
THE COURT: Ron Thurston. Okay. Let's hear that. 
10 Mr. Berry, !--there's an order out of Oregon from 
11 the Judge there that that court has jurisdiction under the 
12 Uniform Child Custody Act, I guess it is. 
13 MR. BERRY: We--we--I haven't seen any order to that 
14 effect at all. She hasn't been served that order; And of 
15 course, under the UCCJA we're entitled to present evidence as 
16 to the jurisdictional questions and the best interests of the 
17 children and the home state of the children. 
18 I--I understand that the court--and I do have 
19 witnesses present--that I--I don't know that today's to do 
20 it--the day to do it, given your calendar. 
21 
22 
THE COURT: I don't think it is. 
MR. BERRY: We have several witnesses and they have 
23 a lot of evidence that we'd like to present on the 
24 jurisdictional question. The court should consider the best 
25 interests of the children and, of course, where the case was 
1 filed and where these folks have lived. These children have 
2 lived in Utah--
3 THE COURT: I tho~ght that had already been 
4 determined in Oregon. 
5 MR. HUNT: I think that--that hearing should have 
6 taken place, if it didn't take place in Oregon; not here. 
7 MR. BERRY: We've never been served anything about a 
8 hearing in Oregon. 
9 THE COURT: Well I don't know what you may have been 
10 served, but I have been in contact with the Judge ln Oregon by 
11 phone and after due conversation with him we came to the 
12 conclusion that the appropriate jurisdiction and determination 
13 of jurisdiction should be made in the state of Oregon. And he 
14 was going to prepare an order to that effect. 
15 MR. HUNT: He did. 
16 MR. BERRY: Well I--I haven't seen any order to that 
17 
18 
effect. 
THE COURT: What do you have there, Mr. Hunt? 
19 MR. HUNT:· Just if I may approach Your Honor. Let 
20 me check. I may have an extra copy. 
21 MR. BERRY: Do you have a copy? 
22 MR. HUNT: I just assumed you had one. I don't 
23 think I have an extra copy. 
24 THE COURT: Well that appears to be an order of 
25 consolidation. 
1 
2 
3 
MR. HUNT: As well as jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. BERRY: Urn, then I--I think that we're entitled 
4 to have our case heard and present evidence as to the 
5 jurisdictional question. There's no domestic proceedings. 
6 THE COURT: Suppose I did that and Oregon did that 
7 and we have--and both come to different conclusions. 
8 MR. BERRY: Well if Oregon declared itself the 
9 jurisdiction. I mean we haven't even--we haven't even been 
10 able to present evidence in Oregon. She hasn't been served 
11 with any documents or motions at all out of Oregon or at least 
12 entitled to be heard. 
13 THE COURT: I understand, Mr. Berry. But I have 
14 conferred with Judge Bennett in Oregon and he I talked about 
15 it and we carne to agreement and from what we could see that 
16 the jurisdiction would best be determined in Oregon and that's 
17 the ruling of this court. 
18 (Whereupon Bench phone rang.) 
19 THE COURT: Hello. No, it is not. 
20 (Court hung up Bench phone.) 
21 MR. BERRY: Urn, the--also, Your Honor, the statute 
22 requires that that conversation with Judge Bennett in Oregon 
23 be, ah, a record be made of that conversation and for this 
24 
25 
court--
THE COURT: You'll have to check with Judge Bennett 
1 on that. 
2 MR. BERRY: And this--this court makes specific 
3 findings as to the facts that's supporting jurisdiction one 
4 way or the other. There's no divorce proceeding pending in 
5 Oregon whatsoever. The first time the issue was raised was by 
6 me and that's with this motion. And these children have lived 
7 in Utah. In two weeks it will be a year. And so at the time 
8 we filed this--
9 THE COURT: The matter was filed up there in June, 
10 wasn't it? Or--
11 MR. BERRY: A protective order proceeding was filed 
12 up there by Mrs. Thurston in June. That was after this court· 
13 had taken jurisdiction in March several months on a protective 
14 order proceeding. And then we had several--(Inaudible)--
15 THE COURT: But you didn't have a year of 
16 jurisdiction at that point. The children hadn't been there 
17 and that was the basis of ruling--of my coming to the 
18 conclusion with Judge Bennett that that was the appropriate 
19 place for it to be--for it to be in Oregon was the fact that 
20 at the time that hearing was scheduled and at the time it was 
21 filed and heard here in Sanpete the children had not been here 
22 in six months. 
23 
24 
25 
MR. BERRY: In March, you're saying. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BERRY: And I think that that's true. But one 
1 of the bases of jurisdiction under the UCCJA is that a risk of 
2 injury to the children. And this court had issued a 
3 protective order based upon ·physical abuse by Mr. Thurston 
4 that occurred here in March. 
5 COURT RULING 
6 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Berry, this is the ruling. 
7 I've given the jurisdiction to Oregon. If you don't think 
8 that's appropriate, you can appeal my decision. But I am 
9 through with it here until somebody does something in Oregon 
10 to get it back here in my hands. 
11 
12 
13 
MR. BERRY: Okay. 
THE COURT: That's the ruling. 
MR. BERRY: And so I take it that Mr. Hunt will 
14 prepare an order to that effect. 
15 
16 
THE COURT: I assume he will, if he's doing his job. 
MR. BERRY: And then may I approach the court at 
17 that time to request under Rule 62 a stay of that order 
18 pending--
19 THE COURT: You can follow the rules and make your 
20 application and we'll go from there. 
21 
22 
23 
MR. BERRY: Thank you, Your Honor: 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BERRY: Urn, so, ah, we've--we won't be permitted 
24 to present witnesses on the question today? 
25 THE COURT: Not today, no. You said you weren't 
1 ready anyway. 
2 
3 
4 get to it. 
MR. BERRY: Well I--
THE COURT: I meaTh you didn't think we were gonna 
5 MR. BERRY: We have the witnesses here and all, 
6 but--
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
it. 
THE COURT: No. I'm not gonna hear any evidence on 
MR. BERRY: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(The above entitled proceedings were completed.) 
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contract for these necessities due to per-
ceived legal limitations affecting contracts 
with minors. The purpose of this legislation 
is to address those limitations. 
(2} For purposes of this section. "minor" 
means an unemancipated and unmarried per-
son who is living apart from the person's 
parent, parents or legal guardian, and who is 
either: 
fa) Sixteen or 17 years of age; 
(b) Under 16 years of age and the parent 
of a child or childr~n who are living in the 
physical custody of the person; or 
(c) Under 16 years of age, pregnant and 
expecting the birth of a child who will be 
living in the physical custody of the person. 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, a minor may contract for the neces-
sities. Df a residential dwelling unit and for 
utility services to that unit. Such a contract 
is binding upon the minor and cannot be 
voided ·or disatrrrmed by the minor based 
upon the minor's age or status as a minor. 
t4J The consent of the parent or legal 
guardian of such minor shall not be neces· 
sary to contract for a residential dwelling. 
unit or utility services to that unit. The par-
ent or legal guardian of such minor shall not 
be liahle under a contract by that minor for 
a residential dwelling unit or for utility ser-
vices to thnt unit unless the parent or. 
guardian is a party to the minor's contract, 
or enters another contract, for the purpose 
of acting- as- guazantm of the minor's debt: 
[1993 c.369 §29] 
109.700 [1973 c.375 §25; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55) 
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION- ANU 
ENFORCEMENT ACT 
(General-P1 owisions)-
109.701 Short title. ORS 109.701 to 
109.834- may be- cited as the- Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. 
[1999 e.649 §l} 
Note: 109.701 to 109.834 were enacted into law by 
the Legislative Assembly but were not added to or made 
a part of ORS chapter 109 or any series therein by leg-
islative action. See Preface to Oregon Revised Statutes 
for further explanation. 
l69;7M Deiarltions·fur·ORS 109".701 to 
109.834. As used in ORS 109.701 to 109.834: 
(1} "Abandoned" means- left without pro-
vision for reasonable and necessary care or 
supervision. 
(2) "Child" means an individual who has 
not attained 18 years of age. 
(3) "Child custody determination" means 
a jud~ent, decree or other order of a court 
providing for the legal custody, physical cus-
tody, parenting time or visitation with re-
spect to a child. "Child custody 
determination" includes a permanent, tempo-
rary, initial and modification order. "Child 
custody determination" -does not include an 
order relating to child support or other mon-
etary obligation of an individual. 
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a 
proceeding in which legal custody, physical 
custody, parenting time or visitation with 
respect to a child is an issue. "Child custody 
proceeding" includes a proceeding for di-
vorce, separation, neglect, abuse, depend-
ency, guardianship, paternity, termination of 
parental rights and protection from domestic 
violence in which the issue may appear. 
"Child custody proceeding" does not include 
a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, 
contractual emancipation or enforcement un-
der ORS 109.774 to 109.827. 
(5) "Commencementn means the filing of 
the first pleading in a proceeding. 
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized 
under the Jaw of a state. to establish, enforce 
or modify a child custody determination. 
(7) "Home state" means the state in 
which a child lived with a parent or a person 
acting as · a parent for at least six consec-
utive months immediately before the com-
mencement of a child custody proceeding. In 
the case of a child less than six months of 
age, "home state" means the state in which 
the child· lived from- birth with any of the 
persons mentioned. Any temporary absence 
of any of the mentioned persons is part of 
the period. 
(8) "Initial determination" means the 
first child custody determination concerning 
a particular child. 
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that 
makes a child custody determination for 
which enforcement is sought under ORS 
109.701 to 109.834. 
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in 
which a child custody determination is made. 
( 11) "Modification" ·means a child cus-
tody determination that changes, replaces, 
supersedes or is otherwise made after a pre-
viaus .. determination concerning the same 
child, whether or not itis made by the court 
that made the previous determination. 
(lZ) "Person" means an individual. cor-
poration, public corporation, business trust, 
estate, trust, partnership, limited liability 
company, association, joint venture, govern-
ment or a governmental subdivision, agency 
or instrumentality, or any other legal or 
commercial entity. 
(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a 
person, other than a parent, who: 
(a) Has physical custody of the child or 
has had physical custody for a period of six 
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consecutive months, including any temporary 
absence, within one year immediately before 
the commencement of a child custody pro-
ceeding; and-
(b) Has been awarded legal custody by a 
court or claiin£ a. right to legal .custody . Wl-
der the law of this state. 
(14) "Physical custody" means the phys-
ical care and supervision of a child. 
(15) "State" means a state of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
the United States Virgin Islands or any ter-
ritory- or insulaz pyssession snbject ·to· the 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
(16.} "Tribe" mean& aa Indian tribe or 
band, or Alaskan Native village, that is re-
cognized by federal law or formally acknowl-
edged by a state. 
(17) "Warrant" means an order issued by 
a court authorizing .. law enforcement officers 
to take physical custody of a child. (1999 c.649 
§21 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.707 Proceedings governed by other 
law. ORS 109.701 to 109.834 do not govern a 
proceeding pertaining to the authorization of 
emergeru:y. medWal care fGr a child. [1999. di4S 
§3] 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.710 [1973 c.375 §2; 1997 c.707 §23; repealed by 
1999 c.649 §55] 
ltl9;7U · Application- to Indian· tribes; 
(1) A child custody proceeding that pertains 
to an Indian child as defined in the Indian 
Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.), is 
not subject to ORS 109.701 to 109.834 to the 
extent that the proceeding is governed by the · 
Indian Child Welfare Act. 
(2.) A. court of this state. shall treat a.. 
tribe as if it were a state of the United 
States for the purpose of applying ORS 
I09.70T.to I09:m. 
(3) A child custody determination made 
by a tribe under factual circumstances in 
substantial conformity with the jurisdictional 
standards of ORS 109.701 to 109.834 must be 
recognized and enforced under ORS 109.774 
to 109.827. [1999 c.649 §4J 
Note! See note under 109.701. 
109..714 International- applkation. of .. 
ORS 109.701 to 109.834. (1) A court of this 
state shall treat a foreign coWttry as if it 
were a state of the United States for the 
purpose of applying ORS 109.701 to 109.771. 
t2) Except- as- otherwise provided· in · sulr 
section (3> of this section, a child custody 
determination made in a foreign country un-
der factual circumstances in substantial con-
formity with the jurisdictional standards of 
ORS 109.701 to 109.834 must be recognized 
and enforced under ORS 109.774 to 109.827. 
(3) A court of this state need not apply 
ORS 109.701 to 109.834 if the child custody 
law of a foreign country violates fundamental 
principles of human rights. [1999 c.649 §51 
Note: See note Wlder 109.701. 
109.717 Effect of ehild custody deter-
mination. A child custody determination 
mo.dc by a court of this state that has juris-
diction under ORS 109.701 to 109.834 binds 
all persons who have been served in accor-
dance with the laws of this state or notified 
in accordance with ORS 109.724 or who have 
submitted to ·the juris(liction of the court, 
and who have been given an opportunity to 
be heard. As to those persons, the determi-
nation is conciusive as to all decided issues 
of law and fact except to the extent the de-
termination is modified. [1999 c.649 §61 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.'r.!n [ 1973 C-375 §§1..23; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55] 
109.721 Priority. If a question of exist-
ence or exercise of jurisdiction under ORS 
109.701 to 109.834 is raised in a child custody 
proceeding, the question, upon request of a 
party, must be given priority on the calendar 
and handled expeditiously. [1999 e.649 §71 
N&te: See Ilole- under 109.701. 
109.724 Notice to persons outside 
state. (1) Notice required for the exercise of 
jurisdiction when a person is outside this 
state may be given in a manner prescribed 
by the law of this state for service of process 
or by the law of the state in which the ser-
vice is· made. Notice JPUSt be given in a 
manner reasonably calculated to give actual 
notice but may be by publication if other 
means are not effective. 
(2) Proof of service may be made in the 
manner prescribed by the law of this state 
or by the law of the state in which the ser-
vice is made; If serv:ice is made by mail, 
proof of service may be a receipt signed by 
the addressee or other evidence of delivery 
to the addressee. 
(3) Notice is not required for the exercise 
of jurisdiction with respect to a person who 
submits to the jurisdiction of the court. [1999 
e.649 §81 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.727 Appearance and limited im· 
munity. (I) A party to a child custody pro-
ceeding, including a modification proceeding, 
or a petitioner or respondent in a proceeding 
to enforce or register ~ child custody deter-
mination, is not subject. to personal jurisdic-
tion in this state for another proceeding or 
purpose solely by reason of having partic-
ipated, or of having been physically present 
for the purpose of participating, in the pro-
ceeding. 
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(2) A persGn who is subject to personal 
jurisdiction in this state on a basis other 
than physical presence is not immune from 
service of process in this state. A party 
present in this state who is subject to the 
jurisdiction of another state is not immune 
from service of process allowable under the 
laws of that state. 
(3) The immunity granted by subsection 
(1) of this section does not extend to civil 
litigation based on acts unrelated to the par-
ticipation in a proceeding under ORS 109.701 
to 109.834 committed by an individual while 
present in this state. [1999 c.649 §91 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.730 [1973 c.375 §3; repealed by 1999 c.649 §551 
109.731 Communication between 
courts. (1) A court of this state may com-
municate with a court in another state con-
cerning. a proceeding . arising under ORS 
109.701 to 109.834. 
(2) The court may allow the parties to 
participate in the communication. If the par-
ties are not able to participate in the com-
munication, they must be given the 
opportunity to present facts and legal argu-
ments before a decision on jurisdiction is 
made. 
(3) Communication between courts on 
schedules, calendars, court records and simi· 
lar matters may occur without informing the 
parties. A record. need . not be made of the 
communication. 
(4) Except as otherwise provided in sub-
section (3) of this section, a record must be 
made of a communication under this section. 
'l'he parties must be- informed promptly of th~ 
communication and granted access to the re~ 
cord. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, "re-
cord" means information that is inscribed on 
a tangible medium or that is stored in an 
electronic or other medium and is retrievable 
in· perceivable form. (1999 c-.649 §101 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
100 .. 734 ·Taking testimony · in another 
state. ( 1) In addition to other procedures 
available to a party, a party to a child cus-
tody proceeding may offer testimony of wit-
nesses who are located in another state, 
including· testimony of the parties and the 
child, by deposition or other means allowable 
in this state for testimony taken in another 
state. The court on its own motion may order 
that the testimony of a person be taken in 
anothe-r sta~ ·and may prescribe the manner 
in which and the terms upon which the tes-
timony is taken. 
(2) A court of this state may permit an 
individual residing in another state to be de-
posed or to testify by telephone. audiovisual 
means or other electronic means before a 
designated court or at another location in 
that state. A court of this state shall coop-
erate with courts of other states in designat-
ing an appropriate location for the deposition 
or testimony. 
(3) Documentary evidence transmitted 
from another state to a court of this state by 
technological means that does not produce 
an original writing may not be excluded from 
evidence on an objection based on the means 
of transmission. [1999 c.649 §111 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.737 Cooperation between courts; 
preservation of records. ( 1) A court of this 
state may request the appropriate court of 
another state to: 
(a) Hold an evidentjary hearing; 
(b) Order a person to produce or give ev-
idence pursuant to procedures of that state; 
(c) Order that an evaluation be made 
with respect to the custody of a child in-
volved in a pending proceeding; 
(d) Forward to the court of this state a 
certified copy of the transcript of the record 
of the hearing, the evidence otherwise pre-
sented and any evaluation prepared in com-
pliance with the request; and 
(e) Order a party to a child custody pro-
ceeding or any person having physical cus-
tody of the child tri appear in the proceeding 
with or without the child. 
{2) Upon request of a court of another 
state, a court of this state may hold a hear-
ing or enter an order described in subsection 
(1) of this section. 
(3) Travel and other necessary and rea-
sonable expenses incurred under subsections 
(1) and (2) of this section may be assessed 
against the parties according to the law of 
this state. 
(4) A court of this· state shall preserve 
the pleadings, . orders, decrees, records of 
hearings, evaluations and other pertinent re-
cords with respect to a child custody pro-
ceeding for the time required by the 
retention schedule adopted under ORS 8.125 
(11). The retention schedule shall require re· 
tention at least until t.he child attains 18 
years of age. Upon appropriate request by a 
court or law enforceme11t official of another 
state, the court shall forward a certified copy 
of those records. [1999 c.649 §121 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.740 (1973 c.375 §4; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55] 
(Jurisdiction) 
109.741 Initial child custody jurisdic· 
tion. ( 1) Except as otherwise provided in 
ORS 109.751, a court of this state has juris-
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diction to make an initial child custody de-
termination only if: 
(a) This state is the home state of the 
child on the date of the commencement of 
the proceeding, or was the home state of the 
child within six months before the com-
meneement of ·~ proeeeding and the child 
is absent from this state but a parent or 
person acting as a parent continues to live 
in this state; 
(b) A court of another state does not 
have jurisdiction under subsection (lXa) of 
this section, or a court of the home state of 
the·child hM declined to exercise· jurisdiction 
on the ground that this state is the more 
appropriate forum under ORS 109.761 or 
109.764, and: 
(A) The child and the child's parents, or 
the child and at least one parent or a person 
acting as a parent, have a significant con-
~tion with. this. state other than mere 
physical presence; and 
(B) Substantial evidence ia available in 
this state concerning the child's care, pro-
tection, training and personal relationships; 
(c) All courts having jurisdiction under 
subsection (l){a) or (b) of this section have 
declined t<t exercise· jurisdiction · on the 
ground that a court of this state is the more 
appropriate forum to detennine the custody 
of the child under ORS 109.761 or 109.764; or 
(d) No court of any other state would 
have jurisdiction under the criteria specified 
in subsection (lXa), (b) or (c) of this section. 
(2) Subsection UJ of this section is the 
exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a 
child.. custody determination. hy .a cnurt. of 
this state. 
{3) Physical presence of, or personal j1,1· 
risdiction over, a party or a child is not nec-
essary or sufficient to make a child custody 
cfetermination. 11999 c.649 §131 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.744 Exclusive, continuing jurisdic-
tion. (1) Except as otherwise provided in 
ORS 109:751, a court of this· state· that bas-
made a child custody determination consist-
ent with ORS 109.741 or 109.747 has exclu-
sive, continuing jurisdiction over the 
determination until: 
(a) A court of tliis state determines that 
neither the child, nor the child and one par-
ent, nor the child and a person acting as a 
parent have a significant connection with 
thi& state -and- that substantial evidenee i&-n~> 
longel' available in this state concerning the 
child's care, protection, training and personal 
relationships; or 
(b) A court of this state or a court of 
another state determines that the child, the 
child's parents and any person acting as a 
parent do not presently reside in this state. 
(2) A court of this state that has made a 
child custody determination and does not 
have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under 
this section may modify that determination 
only if the court has jurisdiction to make an 
initial determination under ORS 109.741. 
11999 c.649 §14} 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.747 Jurisdiction to modify deter· 
mination. Except as otherwise provided in 
ORS 109.751, a court of this state may not 
modify a child custody determination made 
by a court of another state unless a court of 
this state has jurisdiction to make an initial 
detennination under ORS 109.741 ClXa) or (b) 
and: 
(1) The court of the other state deter-
mines that it no longer has exclusive, con-
tinuing jurisdiction under ORS 109.744 or 
that a court of this state would be a more 
convenient forum under ORS 109.761; or 
(2) A court of this state or a court of the 
other state determines that the child, the 
child's parents and any person acting as a 
parent do not presently reside in the other 
state. [1999 c.649 §15) 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.'150 [1973 c.375 §5; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55] 
109.751 Temporary emergency juris-
diction. (1) A court of this state has tempo-
rary emergency jurisdif.tion if the child is 
present in this state and the child has been 
abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency 
to protect the child because the child, or a 
sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to 
or threatened· with mistreatment or abuse. 
(2) If there is no previous child custody· 
determination that is. entitled to be enforced 
under ORS 109.701 to 109.834 and a child· 
custody proceeding has not been commenced 
in a court of a state having jurisdiction un-
der ORS 109.741 to 109.747, a child custody 
determination · made · under this section re-
mains in effect until an order is obtained. 
from a court of a state having jurisdiction 
under ORS 109.741 to 109.747. If a child cus-
tody proceeding has not been or i::; not com• 
menced in a court of a state having 
jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.747, a 
child custody determination made under this 
section becomes a final determination if the 
determination so provides and this state be-
comes the home state of the child. 
(3} If there is a previous child custody 
determination that is entitled to be enforced 
under ORS 109.701 to 109.834, or a child 
custody proceeding has been commenced in 
a court of a state having jurisdiction undei:. 
ORS 109.741 to 109.747, any order issued by 
a court of this state under this section must 
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specify in the order a period that the court 
considers adequate to allow the person se~k­
ing an order to obtain an order from the 
state having jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 
to 109.747. The order issued in this state re-
mains- irr effect until· an- order is- · obtained 
from the other state within the period speci-
fied or the period expires. 
(4) A court of this state that has been 
asked to make a child custody determination 
under this section, upon being informed that 
a child custody proceeding has been com-
menced in, or a child custody determination 
has been made by, a court of a state having 
jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.747, 
shalt immediately communicate with the 
other court. A court of this state that is ex-
ercising jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 
109.747, upon being informed that a child 
custody proceeding has been commenced in, 
or a child custody determination has been 
made by, a court of another state under a 
statute.. similar to this -section, shall imme- · 
diately communicate with the court of that 
state to rewlve the emergency, protect the 
safety of the parties and the child and deter-
mine a period for the duration of the tempo-
rary order .. £1999 c.~ §16J. 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.'154 N&tiee-; ~- to be· 
heard; joinder. (1) Before a child custody 
determination is made under ORS 109.701 to 
109.834, notice and an opportunity to be 
heard in accordance with the standards of 
ORS 1()9;724 must be given to all persons· 
entitled to notice under the law of this state 
as in child custody proceedings between res-
idents of this state, any parent whose par-
ental rights have not been previously 
terminated- and- any person having physical 
custody of the child. 
(2} ORS 169:70-l to·l00;-834 do-not govern 
the enforceability of a child custody determi-
nation made without notice or an. apportu-. 
nity to be heard. 
(3) The obligation to join a party and the 
right to intervene as a party in a child cus· 
tody proceeding under ORS 109.701 to 
109:8-34 are governed- by the law of this state 
as in child custody proceedings between res-
idents of this. state.. [1..999. c.649 U7J 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109-.'15-7 Simulbmeous proeeedings. (1) 
Except as otherwise provided in ORS 109.751, 
a court of this state may not exercise its ju-
risdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.771 if, at 
the time of the commencement of the pro-
ceeding, a proceeding concerning-the custody 
of the child has been commenced in a court 
of another state having jurisdiction substan-
tially in conformity Y.ith ORS 109.701 to 
109.834, unless the proceeding has been ter-
mi-nated or is stayed by the court of the 
other state because a court of this state is a 
more convenient forum u,nder ORS 109.761. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 
109.751, a court of this state, before hearing 
a child custody proceeding, shall examine the 
court documents and other information sup-
plied by the parties under ORS 109.767. If the 
court determines that a child custody pro-
ceeding has been commenced in a court in 
another state having jurisdiction substan-
tially in accordance \\'11th ORS 109.701 to 
109.834, the court of this state shall stay its 
prOceeding and communicate with the court 
of the other state. If the court of the state 
having jurisdiction substantially in accor-
dance with ORS 109.701 to 109.834 does not 
determine that the court of this state is a 
more appropriate forum, the court of this 
state shall dismiss the J)roceeding. 
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child 
custody determination, .a court of this state 
shall determine whether a proceeding to en-
force the determination has been commenced 
in another state. If a proceeding to enforce 
a child custody determination has been com-
menced in another state, the court may: 
(a) Stay the proceeding for modification 
pending the entry of an order of a court of 
the other state enforcing, staying, denying or 
dismissing the proceeding for enforcement; 
(b) Enjoin the parties from continuing 
with the proceeding for enforcement; or 
(c) Proceed with the modification under 
conditions it considers appropriate. [1999 c.649 
§18] 
Note: See note under 109 701. 
Hlt.780· [1973 e.375 §6; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55) 
109.761 Inconvenient forum. (1) A court 
()f this state that· has j~sdiction under ORS 
109.701 to 109.834 to make a child custody 
de~rmination may decline to exercise its ju-
risdiction at any time if the court determines 
that it is an inconvenient forum under the 
circumstances and that a court of another 
state is a more appropriate forum. The issue 
of inconvenient forum may be raised upon 
the motion of a party, the court's own mo-
tion or the request of another court. 
(2) Before determining whether a court 
of this state is an inconvenient forum, the 
cow:t shaH consider whqther it is appropriate 
for a court of another state to exercise ju-
risdiction. For this purpose, the court shall 
allow the parties to submit information and 
shall consider all relevant factors, including: 
(a) Whether domestic violence has oc-
curred and is likely to continue in the future 
and which state could. pest protect the par-
ties and the child; 
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(b) The length of time the child has re-
sided outside this state; 
(c) The distance between the court in 
this state and the court in the state that 
would assume jurisdiction; 
(d) The relative financial circumstances 
of the parties; 
(e) Any agreement of the parties as to 
which state should assume jurisdiction; 
(f) The nature and location of the evi-
dence required to resolve the pending liti-
gation, including testimony of the child; 
(g) The ability of the court of each state 
to .. d.ecide. tha issue expeditiously .. and the 
procedures necessary to present the evi-
dence; and 
(h) The familiarity of the court of each 
state with the facts and issues in the pending 
litigation; 
(3) If a court of this state determines that 
it is an inoonvenient forum and that a court 
of another state is a more appropriate forum, 
it shall stay the proceedings upon condition 
that a child custody proceeding be promptly 
commenced in another designated state and 
may im.pose any other condition . the court 
considers just and proper. 
( 4) A court of this. state. may decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction under ORS 109.701 
to 109.834 if a child custody determination is 
inci den tat tu an ~u;tion for ·divorce or another 
proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction 
over the divorce or other proceeding. [1999 
c.649 §191 
Note: See note Wlder 109.701. 
109.764 Jurisdiction declined by reason 
of conduct. (1) Except as otherwise provided 
in ORS 1~'751· or· 419B.l00, if a court of this-
state has jurisdiction under ORS 109.701 to 
109.834 because a person seeking to invoke 
its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable 
conduct to so invoke the jurisdiction, the 
ll&Urt ·shall deelin~ ·t(t exercise its jurisdiction· 
unless: 
(a) The. parents. and .all persons.at:ting &&· 
parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction; 
(b) A court of the state otherwise having 
jurisdiction under ORS 109.741 to 109.747 
determines· that this- state· is- a nrore appro-
priate forum under ORS 109.761; or 
(c)· N(t eooft· of any other· state· would-
have jurisdiction under the criteria specified 
in ORS 109.741 to 109.747. 
(2) If a court of this state declines to ex-
ercise its jurisdiction under subsection (1) of 
this section, it may fashion an appropriate 
remedy to ensure the safety of the child and 
prevent a repetition .of. the. unjustifiable con-
duct, including staying the proceeding until 
a child custody proceeding is commenced in 
a court having jurisdiction under ORS 
109.741 to 109.747. 
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays 
a proceeding because it declines to exerci~e 
its jurisdiction under subsection (1) of this 
section, it shall assess against the party 
seeking to invoke its jurisdiction necessary 
and reasonable expenses including costs, 
communication expense~, attorney fees, in-
vestigative fees, expenses for witnesses, 
travel expenses and child care expenses dur· 
ing the course of the proceeding unless the 
party from whom necessary and reasonable 
expenses are sought establishes that the as-
sessment would he clearly inappropriate. 
The court may not assess fees, costs or ex-
penses against this state unless authorized 
by law other than ORS 109.701 to 109.834. 
[1999 c.649 §20] 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.767 Information to be submitted 
to court. (1) In a child custody proceeding, 
each party, in its first pleading or in an at-
tached affidavit, shall give information, if 
reasonabl_r ascertainable, under oath as to 
the child s present address or whereabouts, 
the places where the child has lived during 
the last five years and the names and present 
addresses .(}[ th& per50Ils with whom the chlld 
has lived during that period. The pleading or 
affidavit must state whether the party: 
(a) Has participated, as a party or wit-
ness or in any other capacity, in any other 
proceeding concerning- the custody of or par-
enting time or visitation with the child and, 
if so, identify the court. the case number and 
the date of the child custody determination, 
if any; 
(b) Knows of any proceeding that could 
affect the current proceeding, including pro-
ceedings for enforcement and proceedings 
relating to domestic violence, protective or-
ders, termination of parental rights and 
adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the 
case number and the nature of the proceed· 
ing; and 
(c) Knows the names and addresses of 
any person not a party t,o the proceeding who 
has physical custody of the child or claims 
rights of legal custody or physical custody of, 
or parenting time or visitation with, the 
child and, if so, the names and addresses of 
those persons. 
(2) If the information required by subsec-
tion ( 1) of this section is not furnished, the 
court, upon motion of a party or its own 
motion, may stay the proceeding until the 
information is furnished. 
(3) If the declaration as to any of the 
ite.ms described in su~ction (1) of this sec-
tion is in the affirmative, the declarant shall 
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give additional information under oath as re-
quired by the court. The court may examine 
the parties under oath as to details of the 
information furnished and other matters per-
tinent to the court's jurisdiction and the dis-
position of the case. 
(4) Each party has a continuing duty to 
inform the court of any proceeding in this or 
any other state that could affect the current 
proceeding. 
(5) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a 
pleading under oath that the health, safety 
or liberty of a party or child would be jeop-
ardized by disclosure of identifying informa-
tion, the information must be sealed and may 
not be disclosed to the other party or the 
public unless the court orders the disclosure 
to be made after a hearing in which the 
court takes into consideration the health, 
safety or liberty of the party or child and 
determines that the disclosure is in the in-
terest of justice. Costs incurred by the court 
when. special n(}l;ice procedures are made 
necessary by the nondisclosure of identifying 
information shall be paid by the parties as 
deemed appropriate by the court. [1999 c.649 
§21] 
N&&e: See not& Wlde£.1Q9.70.l. 
109.770 [1973 c.375 §7; 1981 c.897 §34; repealed by 
1999 c.649 §55 J 
109.771 Appearance of parties and 
child. (1) In a child custody proceeding in 
this state, the court may order a party to the 
proceeding who is in this state to appear be-
fore the court in person with or without the 
child. The court may order any person who 
is in this state and 'vho has physical custody 
or control of the child to appear in person 
with the child. 
(2) If a party to a child custody proceed-
ing whose presence is desired by the court is 
outside this state, the court may order that 
a notice given under ORS 109.724 include a 
statement directing the party to appear in 
person with or without the child and inform-
ing the party that failure to appear may re-
sult in a decision adverse to the party. 
(3) The court may enter any orders nec-
essary- to ensure· the- safety ofthe ·child and 
of any person ordered to appear under this 
section. 
(4) If a party to a child custody proceed-
ing who is outside this state is directed to 
appear under subsection (2) of this section 
or desires to appear personally before the 
court with or without the child, the court 
may require another party to pay reasonable 
and_ necessary. tra..:el and other. e.x.penses of 
the party and the child so appearing. [1999 
c.649 §22] 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
(Enforcement) 
109.774 Definitions for ORS 109.774 to 
109.827. As used in ORS 109.774 to 109.827: 
(1) "Petitioner" means a person who 
seeks enforcement of an order for return of 
a child under the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction or enforcement of a child custody 
determination. 
(2) "Respondent" means a person against 
whom a proceeding has been commenced for 
enforcement of an order for return of a child 
under the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction or 
enforcement of a child custody determi-
nation. [1999 c.649 §23! 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.777 Enforcement under Hague 
Convention. Under ORS 109.774 to 109.827, 
a court of this state may also enforce an or· 
der for the return of the child made under 
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction as if the 
order were a child custody determination. 
[1999 c.649 §241 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
lf8780 [1973 t-37:> §6; :W81 c.6S7 §35; repealed by 
1999 c.649 §55]· 
109.781 Duty to enforce. (1) A court of 
this state shall recognize and enforce a child 
custody determination of a court of another 
state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction 
in substantial conformity with ORS 109.701 
to 109.834 or the ~mination was made 
under factual circumstances meeting the ju-
risdictional standards of ORS 109.701 to 
109.834 and the determination has not been 
modified in accordance 'with ORS 109.701 to 
109.834. 
(2) A court of this state may utilize any 
remedy available under other law of this 
state to enforce a child custody determi-
nation made by a court· of another state. The 
remedies provided in ORS 109.774 to 109.827 
are cumulative and do- not affect the avail-
ability of other remedies to enforce a child 
custody determination. (1999 c.649 §25] 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.784 Temporary order for parenting 
time or visitation. In a child custody en-
forcement proceeding authorized by law: 
(1) A court of this state that does not 
have jurisdiction to nmdify a child custody 
determination may issue a temporary order 
enforcing: · - · 
(a) A parenting time or visitation sched-
ule made by a court of another state; or 
(b) The visitatidn or parenting time pro-
visions of a child custody determination of 
another state that permit visitation or par-
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enting time but do not provide for a specific 
visitation or parenting time schedule. 
(2) If a court of this state makes an order 
under subsection (l)(b) of this section, the 
court shall specify in the order a period that 
it considers adequate to allow the petitioner 
to obtain an order from a court having iu· 
risdiction under the criteria specified in ORS 
109.741 to 109.771. The order remains in ef-
fect until an order is obtained ·from the other 
court or the period expires. [1999 c.649 ~l 
Net.:- SH lll:lte under 109.701. 
109.787 Registration of child custody 
detennination; notice; hearing. (1) A child 
custody determination issued by a court of 
another state may be registered in this state, 
with or without a· simtrltaneous request for 
enforcement, by sending to any circuit court 
in.t.ha state: 
(a) A letter or .other document requesting 
registration; 
(b) Two copies, including one certified 
copy, of the determination sought to be reg-
istered .. and- a- statement undeP penalty of 
perjury that to the best of the knowledge and 
belief of the ~rson seeking registration the 
order has not been modified; ana 
{c) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 
109:767; tlie name and address of the person 
seeking registration and any parent or per-
son acting as.. a.~.whn ~been awarded 
custody, parenting time or visitation in the 
child custody determination sought to be 
registered. 
(2) On receipt of the documents required 
by_ mbsecticn- (1) of this· section, the regis-
tering court shall cause the determination to 
be filed as a foreign judgment, together with 
one copy of any accompanying documents 
and information, regardless of their form. 
(3} The person seeking registration of a 
child custody determination shal1 serve no-
tire upon the persons named · undct subsec-
tion (lXc) of this section notifying them of 
the opportunity. to. contest. the. registration in 
accordance with this section. 
(4) The notice required by subsection (3) 
of this section must state that: 
(a) A registered determination is en-
lorceabre as of the date of the registration· in 
the same manner as a detennination issued 
by a court ofthis state; 
(b) A hearing to contest the validity of 
the registered determination must be re· 
quested within 21 days after service of no-
tice; and 
(c) Failure to contest the registration 
will result in confirmation of the child eus-
tedy- determination and preclude further. con-
test of that detennination with respect to 
any_ matter that could have been asserted. 
(5) A person seeking to contest the va-
lidity of a registered order must request a 
hearing within 21 days after service of the 
notice. At that hearing, the court shall con· 
firm the registered order unless the person 
contesting registration e_stablishes that: 
(n) The issuing court did not have juris-
diction under ORS 109.741 to 109.771; 
(b) The child custody determination 
sought to be registered has been vacated, 
stayed or modified by a court having juris-
diction to do so under ORS 109.741 to 
109.771; or 
(c) The person contesting registration 
was entitled to notice, but notice was not 
given in accordance with the standards of 
ORS 109.724, in the proceedings before the 
court that issued the order for which regis· 
tration is sought. 
(6) If a timely request for a hearing to 
contest the validity of the registration is not 
made, the registration is confirmed as . a 
matter of law and the person requesting reg-
istration and all persons served must be no-
tified of the confirmation. 
{7) Confirmation of a registered order, 
whether by operation of law or after notice 
and hearing, precludes further contest of the 
order with respect to any matter that could 
have been asserted at the time of registra-
tion. [1999 c.649 §271 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.1!10 [1973 c.375 §9; 1997 c.707 §24; repealed by 
1999 c.649 §551 
109.791 Enforcement of reJistered de-
termination. (1} A court of thiS state may 
grant any relief normally available under- the 
law of this state to enforce a registered child 
custody determination made by a court of 
another state. 
(2) A court of this state shaH recognize 
and enforce, but may not modify, except in 
accordance with ORS 109.741 to 109.771, a 
registered child custody determination of a 
court of another state; (1999 c.649 §281 
Note; See note under 109.701. 
109. '194 "Simultaneous proceedings. If a 
proceeding for enforcement under ORS 
109.774 to 109.827 is .commenced in a court 
of this state and the ootirt determines that a 
proceeding to modify the determination is 
pending in a court of another state having 
jurisdiction to modify the determination un-
der ORS 109.741 to 1Q9.771, the enforcing 
court shall immediately communicate with 
the modifying court. The proceeding for en-
forcement continues unless the enforcing 
court, after consultation with the modifying 
court, stays or dismisses the proceeding. [1999 
c.649 §29l , 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
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109.797 Expedited enforcement of child 
custody determination. (1) A petition un-
der ORS 109.774 to 109.827 must be verified. 
Certified copies of all orders sought to be 
enforced and of any order confirming regis-
tration must be attached to the petition. A 
copy of a certified copy of an order may be 
attached instead of the original. 
(2) A petition for enforcement of a child 
custody determination must state: 
(a) Whether the court that issued the de-
termination identified the jurisdictional basis 
it relied upon in exercising jurisdiction and, 
if so, what the basis was; 
(b) Whether the deternnnation for which 
enforcement is sought has been vacated, 
stayed or modified by a court whose decision 
must be enforced under ORS 109.701 to 
109.834 and, if so, must identify the court, 
the ca&-e number and the nature -of the pro-
ceeding; 
(e) Whether any- prooeeding has been 
commenced that could affect the current 
proceeding, including proceedings relating to 
domestic violence, protective orders, termi-
nation of parental rights and adoptions and, 
if SG,- must identify. the court, the case num-
ber and the nature of the proceeding; 
(d) The present physical address of the 
child and the respondent, if known; 
(e) Whether relief in addition to the im-
mediate physical custody of the child and at-
torney fees is sought, including a request for 
assistance from law enforcement officials 
and, if so, the relief sought; and 
(f) If the clllld eustody determination has 
been registered and confirmed under ORS 
109.787, the date and place of registration. 
(3) Upon the flling of a petition, the 
court shall issue an order directing the re-
spondent to appear in person with or without 
the child at a hearing and may enter any 
order necessary to ensure the safety of the 
parties and the child. If the court issues an 
order, the order shall be served in the man-
ner the court determines · to be appropriate 
under the circumstances of the case and may 
include service by the sheriff. The person re-
questing the order shall pay the costs of ser-
vice. The court shall hold the hearing as 
soon- as reasonably possib-le· and- shall expe-
dite the hearing if it finds an emergency is 
present. 
(4) An order issued under subsection (3) 
of this section must state the time and place 
of the hearing and advise the respondent that 
at the hearing the court will order that the 
petitioner may take- immediate physical cus-
tody of the child and will order the payment 
of fees, costs and expenses under ORS 
109.811, and may schedule a hearing to de-
termine whether further relief is appropriate, 
unless the respondent .. appears and estab-
lishes that: 
(a) The child custody determination has 
not been registered and confirmed under 
ORS 109.787 and that: 
(A) The issuing court did not have juris-
diction under ORS 109.741 to 109.771; 
(B) The child custody determination for 
which enforcement is sought has been va-
cated, stayed or modified by a court having 
jurisdiction to do so under ORS 109.741 to 
109.771; or 
(C) 'I'he respondent was entitled to no-
tice, but notice was not given in accordance 
with the standards of ORS 109.724, in the 
proceedings before the court that issued the 
order for which enforcement is sought; or 
(b) The child custody determination for 
which enforcement is sought was registered 
and confirmed under ORS 109.787, hut has 
been vacated, stayed or modified by a court 
of a state having jurisdiction to do so under 
ORS 109.741 to 109.771. [t999 c.649 §30l 
Note: See note. under 109.701. 
109.800 [1973 c.375 §10; 1997 c.707 §25; repealed by 
1999 c.649 §55 I 
109.801 Service of petition and order. 
Except as otherwise provided in ORS 109.807, 
the petition and order for enforcement of a 
child custody determination must be served 
by the petitioner, by any method authorized 
for service of process within this state, upon 
the respondent and any person who has 
physical custody of the child. [1999 c:.649 §311 
No~e: See note under 109.701. 
109.804 Immediate physical custody of 
child allowed; exceptions; spousal privi-
lege not allowed in certain proceedings. 
(1) Unless the court issues a temporary 
emergency order under ORS 109.751, upon a 
finding that a petitioner is entitled to imme-
diate physical custody of the child under the 
controlling child custoqy determination, the 
court shall order that the petitioner may 
take immediate physical custody of the child 
unless the respondent establishes that: 
(a) The child custody determination has 
not been registered and confirmed under 
ORS 109.787 and that: 
<Al The issuing court did not have juris-
diction under ORS 109.741 to 109.771; 
(B) The child custody determination for 
which enforcement is sought has been va· 
cated, stayed or modified by n court of a 
state having jurisdiction to do so under ORS 
109.741 to 109.771; or 
(C) The respondent was entitled to no-
tice, but notice was not given in accordance 
with the standards of ORS 109.724, in the 
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proceedings before the court that issued the 
order. for .which enforcement is sought; or 
(b) The child custody detennination for 
which enforcement is sought was registered 
and confinned under ORS 109.787, but has 
been vacated, stayed or modified by a court 
of a- sta-re- having jurisdiction to do so under 
ORS 109.741 to 109.771. 
(2). The court shall award the fees, costs-
and expenses authorized under ORS 109.811, 
may grant additional relief, including a re-
quest for the assistance of law enforcement 
officials, and may set further hearings, if 
necessary,. to determine whether additional 
relief is appropriate. 
(3) A privilege ag~nst disclosure of com-
munications between spouses and a defense 
of immunity based on the relationship of 
husba:ml- and wife· or parent and ·child may 
not be invoked .in a proceeding under ORS 
109.774 to 109.827. [1999 1:.649 §32] 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.807 Warrant to take phpical cus-
tody of child. (1) Upon the filing of a peti-
tion seeking enforcement of a child custody 
determination, the- petitioner· may ·file ·a ven-
fied application for the issuance of a warrant 
to take physical custody of the child if the 
chffiJ is immediatefy likely to suffer serious 
physical harm or be removed from this state. 
(2) If tire court, upon- the· testimony of the 
petitioner or other witness, is satisfied that 
there is probable cause to believe that the 
child is imminently likely to suffer serious 
physical hann or he removed from this state, 
it may issue· a ·warnmt·tu ·take physical cus-
tody of the child. The petition must be heard 
on the next j1,1dicial day after the warrant is 
executed unless that date is impossible. In 
that event, the court shall hold the hearing 
ctn · the fll'St judicial day possible: The· ap~li­
cation for the warrant must include the 
statements required by ORS 109.797 (2). 
(3) A warrant to take physical custody 
of a child must: 
(a) Recite the facts upon which a con-
clusion of imminent serious physical harm or 
removal from the jurisdiction is based; 
(b) Direct law enforcement officers to 
take physical custody of. the. child . imme- . 
diately; and 
(c) Provide for the placement of the child 
pending final relief. 
(4) The respondent must be served with 
the petition, warrant and order immediately 
after the child is taken into physkal custody. 
(5} A warrant to take physical custody 
of a child is enforceable throughout this 
state. If the court fmds on the basis of the 
testimony of the petitioner or other witness 
that a less intrus1ve remedy is not effective, 
it may authorize law enforcement officers to 
enter private propt!rtY to take physical cus-
tody of the child. If required by exigent cir-
cumstances of the case, the court may 
authorize law enforcement officers to make 
a forcible entry at any hour. 
(6) The court may impose conditions 
upon placement of a child to ensure the ap-
pearance of the child and the child's custo-
dian. {1999 e649 §331 
Note: See note under 109.70L 
109.810 11973 c.375 §11; repealed by 1999 c.649 §551 
109.811 Costs, fees and expenses. (1) 
The court shall award the prevailing party, 
including a state, necessary and reasonable 
expenses incurred by or on behalf Qf the 
party, including costs, communication ex-
penses, attorney fees, investigative fees, ex-
penses for witnesses, travel expenses and 
child care expenses during the course of the 
proceedings, unless the party from whom fees 
or expenses are sought, establishes that the 
award would be clearly inappropriate. An 
award may be inappropriate if the award 
would cause the parent or child to seek pub-
lic assistance. 
(2) The court may not assess fees, costs 
or expenses against a state unless authorized 
by law other than ORS 109.701 to 109.834. 
(1999 !!.649 §34} 
Nete: See note under 109.701. 
109.814 Recoguition and enforcement. 
A court of this state s~ll a:ccord full faith 
and credit to an order issued by another 
state and consistent with ORS 109.701 to 
109.834 that enforces a child custody deter-
mination by a court of another state unless 
the order has been vaatted, stayed or modi-
fied by a court having jurisdiction to do so 
under ORS 109.741 to 109.771. ll999 c.649 §35] 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.817 Appeals. An appeal may be 
taken from a final order in a proceeding un-
der ORS 109.774 to 109.827 in accordance 
with ORS chapter 19. Unless the court en-
ters a temporary emergency order under ORS 
109.751, the enforcing court may not stay an 
. order enforcing a child custody determi-
nation pending appeal. [1999 c.649 §361 
Note: See not!! W1der 109.701. 
109.820 [1973 c.375 §12; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55] 
109.821 Role of district attorney. {1) In 
a case arising under ORS 109.701 to 109.834 
or involving the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, the district attorney may take 
any lawful action, including resort to a pro-
ceeding under ORS 109.774 to 109.827 or any 
other available civil proceeding, to locate a 
child, obtain the return of a child or enforce 
a child custody determination if there is: 
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(a) An existing child custody determi-
nation; 
(b) A request to do so from a court in a 
pending child custody proceeding; 
(c) A reasonable belief that a criminal 
statute· has been violated; or 
(d) A reasonable belief that the child has 
been wrongfully removed or retained in vio-
lation of the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction. 
(2) A district attorney acting under this 
section acts on behalf of the state to protect 
the state•s interest in the enforcement of 
ORS 109.701 to 109.834 and may not repre-
sent any party. [1999 c.649 §371 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.824 Role of .law enforcement offi· 
cer. At the request of a district attorney 
acting under ORS 109.821, a law enforcement 
officer may take any lawful action reason-
ably nece~ary to locate a child or a party 
and assist a district attorney with responsi-
bilities under ORS 109.821. [1999 c.649 §38J 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.827 Costs and expenses of district 
attorney and law enforcement officers. If 
the respondent is not the prevailing party, 
the court may assess against the respondent 
all direct expenses and costs incurred by the 
district attorney and law enforcement offi-
cers under ORS 109.821 or 109.824. [1999 c.649 
§39} 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.83& £1M3 e.375 l13; repealed by 1999 c.64& i55J 
(Miscellaneous Prcvlisions) 
109.831 Application and construction. 
In.. applying and construing ORS 109.701 to 
109.834, consideration must be given to the 
need to promote uniformity of the law with 
respect to its- subject- mattPr ·among- states 
that enact it. [1999 e.649 §4DJ 
Note: See note under 109.701. 
109.834 Severability clause. H any pro-
vision of ORS 109.701 to 109.834 or its appli-
cation to any person or circumstance is held 
invalid, the invalidity does not affect other 
provisions or applications of ORS 109.701 to 
109.834 that can be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application, and to this 
end the provisions of ORS 109.701 to 109.834 
are severable. (1999 e.649 §411 
Note: See note Wlder 109.701. 
Note: Section 42, chapter 649. Oreeon Laws 1999, 
provides: 
s.e. 42. A motion or other request for relief made 
in a child custody proceeding or to enforce a child 
custody determination that was commenced before the 
etreWve date of this 1999 Act [October 23, 1999] is gov-
erned by the law in effect at the time the motion or 
other request was made. [1999 c.649 §42] 
109.840 [1973 c.375 §14; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55] 
109.850 [1973 c.375 §15; i981 c.897 §36; repealed by 
1999 c.649 f.'i.'i] 
109.860 [1973 c.375 §16; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55] 
109.870 [1973 c.375 §17; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55) 
109.880 L1973 e.375 §18; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55] 
109.880 [1973 c.375 §19; iepeaied. by 1999 c.649 §55] 
109.900 [1973 c.375 §20; repealed by 1999 c.649 ~] 
109.910 [1973 c.3i5 §21; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55] 
lOU'JO [1973 c.375 §22; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55) 
109SJO [1973 c.3i5 §24; repealed by 1999 c.649 §55] 
PENALTY. 
109.990 Penalty. (1) A person who vio-
lates ORS 109.311 (3) or who submits a false 
statement under ORS 109.311 (1) commits a 
Class C felony. 
(2) A person \Vho violates any provision 
of ORS 109.311 (4) or 109.502 to 109.507 or 
any rule adopted pursuant to ORS 109.506 
commits a Class A misdemeanor. [1985 e.403 §2 
(4); 1993 c.717 §5; subsection (3) of 1993 Edition enacted 
as 1993 c.410 §9; 1995 c.79 §44; 1995 c.730 §4] 
.Note: See note Wider 109.425. 
Title 11 Page 109 (1999 Edition) 
UT ST § 78-45c-3, Bases of jurisdiction in this state 
Utah Code § 78-4Sc-3 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state 
Page 1 
( 1) A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a 
child custody determination by initial or modification decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the 
following paragraphs are met: 
(a) this state: 
(i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding; or 
(ii) had been the child's home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding and the 
child is absent from this state because of his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for 
other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this state; 
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because: 
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with 
this state; and 
(ii) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships; 
(c) the child is physically present in this state or this state is the most recent domicile of the mother 
prior to the birth of the child, and: 
(i) the child has been abandoned; or 
(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened 
with mistreatment or abuse or is o1herwise neglected or dependent; or 
( d)(i) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in 
accordance wi1h Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c), or ano1her state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the 
ground that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child; and 
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that this court assume jurisdiction. 
(2) Except under Subsections ( 1 )(c) and (d), physical presence in this state of the child, or of the child 
and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a 
child custody determination. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1997 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works 
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(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to detennine his 
custody. 
*24561 
As last amended by Chapter 143, Laws of Utah 1990. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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UT ST § 78-45c-4, Persons to be notified and heard 
Utah Code § 78-45c-4 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Cu"ent through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 78-45c-4. Persons to be notified and heard 
Page 1 
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to 
the contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, and any person who 
has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons is outside this state, notice and opportunity to be 
heard shall be given pursuant to section 78-45c-5. 
As enacted by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 1980. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 78-45c-5 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 78-45c-5. Service of notice outside state-Proof of service--Submission to jurisdiction 
Page 1 
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person outside this state shall be given in a 
manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and may be made in any of the following ways: 
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the manner prescribed for service of process within this 
state; 
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made for service of process 
in that place in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; 
(c) By any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting a receipt; or 
(d) As directed by the court (including publication, if other means of notification are ineffective). 
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, delivered, or last published at least 10 days 
before any hearing in this state. 
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be made by affidavit of the individual who made the service, 
or in the manner prescribed by the law of this state, the order pursuant to which the service is made, or the 
law of the place in which the service is made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by 
the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee. 
( 4) Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court. 
As enacted by Chapter 41. Laws of Utah 1980. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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exercised--Inquiry to other state--Information exchange--Stay of proceeding on 
notice of another proceeding 
Utah Code § 78-45c-6 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Cu"ent through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 78-45c-6. Proceedings pending elsewhere--Jurisdiction not exercised--Inquiry to other state--
Information exchange--Stay of proceeding on notice of another proceeding 
(1) A court of this state shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this act if at the time of f:tling the 
petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of another state 
exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the 
court of the other state because this state is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons. 
(2) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall examine the pleadings and other 
information supplied by the parties under section 78-45c-10 and shall consult the child custody registry 
established under section 78-45c-16 concerning the pendency of proceedings with respect to the child in 
other states. If the court has reason to believe that proceedings may be pending in another state it shall 
direct an inquiry to the state court administrator or other appropriate official of the other state. 
(3) If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the 
custody of the child was pending in another state before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the 
proceeding and communicate with the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the 
issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in accordance 
with sections 78-45c-19 through 78-45c-22. If a court of this state has made a custody decree before 
being informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state it shall immediately inform that court 
of the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding was commenced in another state after it assumed 
jurisdiction it shall likewise inform the other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the more 
appropriate forum. 
As enacted by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 1980. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code § 78-45c-7 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess. 
Page 1 
§ 78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient forum-Factors in determination--
Communication with other court--Awarding costs 
( 1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an initial or modification decree may decline 
to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it fmds that it is an inconvenient forum to 
make a custody determination under the circmnstances of the case and that a court of another state is a 
more appropriate forum. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a 
party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the 
child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into account the following 
factors, among others: 
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's home state; 
(b) If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child and one or 
more of the contestants; 
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships is more readily available in another state; 
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; and 
(e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any of the purposes stated in 
section 78-45c-1. 
( 4) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court may communicate with a 
court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either court 
with a view to assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum 
will be available to the parties. 
(5) If the court fmds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more 
appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a 
custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another named state or upon any other conditions which 
may be just and proper, including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent and submission 
to the jurisdiction of the other forum. 
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*24566 ( 6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this act if a custody determination 
is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or 
other proceeding. 
(7) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may require the party who 
commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary 
travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment 
is to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party. 
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall inform the court found to 
be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the court which would have jurisdiction in the other state 
is not certainly known, shall transmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate 
official for forwarding to the appropriate court. 
(9) Any communication received from another state informing this state of a finding of inconvenient 
forum because a court of this state is the more appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of 
the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this state shall inform the original court of 
this fact. 
As enacted by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 1980. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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jurisdiction--Notice to another jurisdiction--Ordering petitioner to appear in 
other court or to return child--Awarding costs 
Utah Code§ 78-45c-8 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM CHUD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for refusing jurisdiction--Notice to another 
jurisdiction-Ordering petitioner to appear in other court or to return child--Awarding costs 
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has 
engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of 
adjudication of custody if this is just and proper under the circumstances. 
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a 
custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody has 
improperly removed the child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has 
improperly retained the child after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the 
petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state the court may decline to 
exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances. 
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdiction upon petition for an initial custody decree pursuant 
to Subsection ( 1 ), the court shall notify the parent or other appropriate person and the prosecuting attorney 
of the appropriate jurisdiction in the other state. If a request to that effect is received from the other state, 
the court shall order the petitioner to appear with the child in a custody proceeding instituted in the other 
state in accordance with Section 78-45c-20. If no such request is made within a reasonable time after such 
notification, the court may entertain a petition to determine custody by the petitioner if it has jurisdiction 
pursuantto Section 78-45c-3. 
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction to modify the custody decree of another state 
pursuant to Subsection (2) or pursuant to Section 78-45c-14, the court shall notify the person who has 
legal custody under the decree of the other state and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate 
jurisdiction in the other state and may order the petitioner to return the child to the person who has legal 
custody. If it appears that the order will be ineffective and the legal custodian is ready to receive the child 
within a period of a few days, the court may place the child in a foster care home for such period, pending 
return of the child to the legal custodian. At the same time, the court shall advise the petitioner that any 
petition for modification of custody must be directed to the appropriate court of the other state which has 
continuing jurisdiction, or, in the event that that court declines jurisdiction, to a court in a state which has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-4Sc-3. 
*24568 (5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section may charge the 
petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees and the cost of returning the 
child to another state. 
Added by lAws 1980, c. 41. Amended by lAws 1995, c. 20, § 175, eff. May 1, 1995. 
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jurisdiction--Notice to another jurisdiction--Ordering petitioner to appear in 
other court or to return child--Awarding costs 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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Utah Code§ 78-45c-12 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 2. CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
CHAPTER 45C. UNIFORM ClllLD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
Cu"ent through End of 1997 General and 1st and 2nd Sp. Sess. 
§ 78-45c-12. Parties bound by custody decree--Conclusive unless modified 
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had jurisdiction under section 78-45c-3, binds 
all parties who have been served in this state or notified in accordance with section 78-45c-5 or who have 
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to 
these parties the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to the custody 
determination made unless and until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including the 
provisions of this act. 
As enacted by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah 1980. 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
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CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
FOR LINCOLN COUNTY, 17TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
P.O. Box 100 
Newport, Oregon 97365 
Telephone (541) 265-4236 
I, THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, OF THE STATE OF OREGON FOR 
LINCOLN COUNTY, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING COPY OF CASE 
FILE 001309. HAS BEEN COMPARED BY ME WITH THE ORIGINAL AND THAT IT IS A 
CORRECT TRANSCRIPT THEREFROM, AND OF THE WHOLE OF SUCH ORIGINAL AS 
THE SAME APPEARS ON FILE OR OF RECORD IN MY OFFICE AND IN MY CUSTODY. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MY HAND AND AFFIXED THE 
SEAL OF SAID COURT THIS 25TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2000. 
BY\i.~ 
CIRCUIT COURT RK. 
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CIRCUiT __ !:DISTRICT COURT 
FILED . ~--- __ RECEIVED ___ _ 
r-~ ;\R 2 o 2000 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
Department of Domestic Relations 
11 RONALD THURSTON, ) ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No:t:Jtf!,<:J/Jt? 
12 
13 and 
Petitioner, 
PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION 
OF MARRIAGE 
14 JENNIFER THURSTON, 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Respondent. 
Petitioner alleges: 
l. 
The Petitioner and Respondent were married in Sanpete County, Utah on January 28, 
20 1983 and have ever since been husband and wife. 
21 
22 
2. 
Irreconcilable differences between the parties have caused the irremediable breakdown 
23 of their marriage. 
24 /// 
25 Ill 
26 Ill 
27 
28 Page 1- PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 
MARK G. OBERT 
Attorney at Law 
1740 Liberty St. SE 
Salem, OR 97302 
(503) 375-6278 
1 3. 
2 There are two other domestic relations suits involving dependents of this marriage is 
3 pending in Lincoln County Courts. They are restraining order cases titled Jennifer Thurston vs 
4 Ronald Thurston, Lincoln County Case Nq. 99-1560 and Ronald Thurston vs. Jennifer Thurston, 
5 Lincoln County Case No. 99-1558. Both of these cases were consolidated by the court in an Order 
6 dated November 12, 1999 which also gave custody of the parties minor children to the Petitioner 
7 herein. A dissolution and child custody proceeding was filed in Sanpete County, Utah by the 
8 Respondent. The Utah court dismissed the action on the basis that Oregon was the proper forum for 
9 the determination of issues regarding the minor children. Finally there is a criminal case pending in 
10 which the Respondent has been indicted for taking the children from the State of Oregon against the 
11 Order of the court in the above listed Oregon cases. 
12 4. 
13 For more thansix(6) months prior to the filing ofthe Petition herein, Petitioner is now 
14 and has been a continuous resident of the State of Oregon. 
15 5. 
16 The children bornofthismarriageare: MELISSA LEE THU~STON, born August 
17 6, 1983, TRISCHA LEIGHANNE THURSTON, born July 16, 1985, and CHRISTOPHER 
18 LYNDON THURSTON, born December 5, 1989. Respondent is not now pregnant. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
(a) The addresses where the children have lived and the persons lived with during 
the last two years are as follows: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Salem, Oregon, with Petitioner and Respondent from 1993 to 1998; 
lO I Salishshan Dr., Glenden Beach, Oregon with Petitioner and 
Respondent from 1998 through 1999; 
Somewhere in Utah with Respondent from 1999 to present. 
Lincoln County Oregon has jurisdiction of these children based upon the Court's 
26 rulings in Lincoln County Case No. 99-1558 and 99-1560. 
27 
28 Page 2- PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 
MARK G. OBERT 
Attorney at Law 
1740 Liberty St. SE 
Salem. OR 97302 
(b) Petitioner has participated as a party in the cases listed in 3 above regarding 
2 ligation concerning the custody of the minor child in this or any other state. Petitioner knows of no 
3 person not a party to the proceeding who has physical custody of the minor child or claims to have 
4 custody or visitation rights with respect to ~he minor child. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
6. 
The other information required by ORS 107.085(3) is: 
(a) Petitioner's residence or legal address is 5015 Dune Ct., Lincoln City, Oregon; 
his date ofbirth is January 25, 1965; he is 34 years old; this is the first marriage of the 
Petitioner. 
(b) Respondent's residence or legal address is currently unknown, however it is 
thought she might be with her parents at 251 S. Main, Sterling Utah.; her age is 34 
years old; her date of birth is August 9, 1966; her social security number is unknown; 
this is the first marriage of the Respondent. Respondent's maiden n3me is Gibb. 
7. 
Petitioner is a fit and proper persons and should be awarded the care, custody and 
16 control ofthe parties minor children. Respondent should be granted limited supervised visitation 
17 with the minor children due to the risk of her leaving the state with the children and secrete the 
18 children from the Petitioner. 
19 8. 
20 Respondent should be required to pay and Petitioner should have judgment against 
21 Respondent for the support of the parties minor children, pursuant to the State of Oregon Child 
22 Support Guidelines. Support should commence on the first day of the month following entry of the 
23 Judgment ofDissolution and continue on the same day of each month thereafter until the minor child 
24 cease to qualify as a "child attending school" as defined in ORS 107,198(4) or attains the age of18 
25 years, whichever shall last occur. Support should be recalculated at that time in accordance with 
26 then-existing statutory child support guidelines 
27 
28 Page3- PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 
MARK G. OBERT 
Attorney at Law 
1740 Liberty St. SE 
Salem, OR 97302 
ten'!\ '1'"7c: L"'t"70 
NOTICE 
2 Oregon Law now requires that payment of child support under new or modified orders 
3 be by income withholding, even if no arrearage is owed. An exception to withholding may be granted 
4 pursuant to ORS 25.317 if good cause is found to exist or the parties agree in writing to another 
5 arrangement. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
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(a) Payments should be made through the Department of Human Resources, PO 
Box 14506, Salem, Oregon, 97309. The Department of Human Resources 
should provide collection, accounting, distribution and enforcement services 
in accordance with the provisions ofORS 25.320; 
(b) The party obligated to pay support should pay any service charges imposed 
by the collecting agency. 
9. 
As additional support, Respondent should be required to: 
(a) Pay one-half of all of the children's reasonably incurred medical, opticaL 
hospitaL dental and orthodontic expenses which are not covered by insurance. 
b) Maintain an insurance policy insuring his life in an ~ount not less than 
$200,000.00, naming the minor child (or a trustee on their behalf), as 
beneficiaries. 
( 1) The obligation to maintain insurance should continue so long as 
Respondents are required to pay child support as decreed by the court or an 
arrearage exists for accrued but unpaid support; 
(2) The following provisions relate to procedural aspects of the 
requirement to maintain insurance: 
A) During the term of the obligation to maintain insurance 
Respondents should furnish to Petitioners, upon request, a 
copy of the policy or evidence the proper life insurance is in 
force with the appropriate bef!e~ciary designation in effect. 
B) A constructive trust should be imposed over the proceeds of 
any insurance owned by Respondents at the time of 
Respondents' death if Respondents fail to maintain insurance 
in said amount, or if said insurance is in force but another 
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C) 
D) 
beneficiary is designated to receive said funds. 
Respondents are prohibited from borrowing any monies from 
or against or in any way reducing the benefits of said policies. 
Respondents should provide a certified copy of this order to 
the appropriate life insurance company in accordance with the 
provisions ofORS 107.820(6), notify said company as to the 
terms of this order regarding life insurance and instruct it to 
update its records to guarantee compliance herewith. 
Respondents should provide Petitioners proof of compliance 
with this provision within 60 days of the date of this order. 
8 10. 
9 Each party should maintain the minor children of the parties on their medical, dental 
10 and hospital insurance so long as said insurance is available through her place of employment at little 
11 or no cost. 
12 11. 
13 The parties do not own real property. 
14 12. 
15 Petitioner and Respondent have previously divided their personal property and each 
16 party should be awarded the property in their control as of the date of this petition free from any 
17 claim of the other. 
18 13. 
19 Petitioner and Respondent should each be awarded the bank accounts, retirement 
20 accounts and any other financial possessions in their name as of the date ofthis petition free from any 
21 claim ofthe other. 
22 14. 
23 Respondent has incurred various doctor bills and she should be required to pay said 
24 bills and hold Petitioner harmless therefrom . Each party should be awarded the remaining debts in 
25 their name as of the date of this petition. 
26 Ill 
27 
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1 15. 
2 Respondent should be required to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees and costs incurred 
3 herein if this matter is contested. If the matter is not contested, each party should pay their respective 
4 attorney fees. 
5 
6 
16. 
Each of the parties should pay the debt incurred by that party since their separation 
7 on or about June 1999. 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
I4 
15 
16 
17 
18 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for a Judgment: 
1. Dissolving the marriage of the parties; 
2. Granting relief in conformance with the allegations of this petition; and, 
3. Granting other appropriate equitable relief as this court finds just and proper. 
DATED this~ day of March, 2000. 
9?;£CfPR s G. OBERT, OSB NO. 96380 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Trial Attorney 
19 STATEOFOREGON ) ) ss. 
20 Cowtty ofMarion ) 
21 I, RONALD THURSTON, Petitioner herein, underpenaltyofperjury, swear that to 
~: =•o~ny,=.ormation and belief, all the~ dissolution of 
25 
26 
27 
Ill 
Ill 
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CERTIFICATE OF RESIDENCY 
2 
ForthepurposeofORS 14.070 and UTCR8.010{1), I herebycertifythatl and/or the 
3 Respondent currently reside in Lincoln County, where the foregoing Petition for Dissolution of 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Marriage is being filed. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1J,_ day of March 2000. 
-
OFFICIAL SEAL 
MARK G. OBERT 
NOTARY PUBLIC - OREGON 
COMMISSION NO. 057578 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES SEPT. 12, 2000 My Commission Expires cut~/ D;:> I 
NOTICE TO PARTIES IN SUIT FOR MARRIAGE, 
DISSOLUTION OR LEGAL SEPARATION 
14 If you are a spouse who is covered as a dependent under a group health insurance 
policy, Oregonlaw(ORS 743.850 to 743.890) allows you to maintain health insurance coverage after 
15 divorce or legal separation, when you might otherwise lose that coverage. You may continue 
coverage under the group policy or you may obtain coverage under an individual health insurance 
16 policy. You may also maintain coverage for any dependent whose coverage otherwise would end 
because of the dissolution or legal separation. The following is a summary of the applicable laws: 
17 
I. If you are a divorced or legally se.parated spouse and you are 55 years of age 
18 or older at the time of the dissolution or legal separation, you may continue coverage under the group 
policy: 
19 
a. If you notify the group health insurance plan administrator in writing 
20 of the legal separation or dissolution within 60 days of the legal separation or the entry of the 
Judgment and Decree; 
21 
b. If you elect to continue the group coverage and you make the electric 
22 on a form provided by the plan administrator; and, 
23 c. If you pay the premium when due. 
24 This provision applies only with respect to employers with 20 or more employees and 
group health insurance plans with 20 or more certificate holders. ThiS provision does not apply to 
25 policies issued before September 27, 1987, but does apply to policies issued or renewed on or after 
September 27, 1987. 
26 
27 
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2. If you are a divorced spouse who has not reached 55 years of age at the time 
PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE MARK G. OBERT Attorney at Law 
1740 Liberty St. SE 
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of dissolution, you may continue coverage under the group policy upon dissolution of the marriage 
if you request the insurer or the group policyholder in writing to continue coverage. You must make 
2 the request not later than 10 days after the date that your coverage under the group policy as a 
qualified family member would end, or I 0 days after the date on which the employer or policyholder 
3 gives notice ofthe right to continue coverage, whichever date is later; however, in any case you may 
not make the request later than the 31st day after your coverage as a qualified family member ends. 
4 
This provision: 
5 
a. Applies with respect to employers who are not required under federal 
6 law to make continuation of coverage benefits available. 
7 b. Applies with respect to employers with 20 or more employees and 
group health insurance plans with 20 or more certificate holders. 
8 
9 
c. Does not apply to legally separated spouses. 
3. If you are a divorced or legally separated spouse, regardless of age, you may 
10 obtain coverage under an individual health insurance policy by applying to the group insurer either 
within 31 days following the date on which the coverage under the group policy ends because you 
11 are no longer a qualified family member or at any time while coverage under the group policy is 
continued as described in the paragraphs above. 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
This notice is intended to tell you that you may be able to continue your health 
coverage after your divorce or separation and that your time for doing so is limited." However, this 
notice is not a complete statement of all Oregon laws that may apply to you. For more information, 
you should call your health insurer, the plan administrator for your insurance coverage, the employer 
to whom your insurance is provided, or your attorney. 
28 Page 8- PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 
MARK G. OBERT 
Attorney at Law 
1740 Liberty St. SE 
Salem, OR 97302 
l'iOl\ '\'7<;.J;.nR 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN 
Department of Domestic Relations 
RONALD THURSTON, ) 
) Case No: 001309 
Petitioner, ) 
) PROOF OF SERVICE 
and ) 
) 
JENNIFER THURSTON, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
STATEOFOREGON ) 
) ss. 
County of Marion ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I made service of the foregoing Petition for Disoslution, 
Motion for Temporary Relief and Show Cause, Order to Show Cause, Motion, Affidavit and Order 
for Temporary Custody and Order Granting Temporary Custody to the within named Respondent 
by delivering, or leaving a true copy of said documents, certified to be such by the attorney for the 
Respondent as follows: 
PERSONAL SERVICE 
.15 \ S . By delivering such true copy to the Respondent personally and in person at ~I , m Ov\ \3 ' .S\-ex\ \ '3' Utah, on mAy 0 3 '2000, at 
q. ':lr o clock, ~.m. 
PROOF OF SERVICE MARK G. OBERT 
Attorney at Law 
1740 Liberty St. SE 
Salem, OR 97302 
(503) 375-6278 
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE 
By delivering such true copy at Defendant's dwelling house or usual place of abode, 
to-wit: , to , 
who is a person over the age of 14 years and a member of the household of the Respondent, on 
-------------' 2000, at o'clock, _.m. 
OFFICE SERVICE 
By delivering such true copy of the documents to , the 
person who is apparently in charge of the office which Defendant maintains for the conduct ofhis/her 
business at on , 2000, during normal 
working hours, at to wit: o'clock _.m. 
DATED: ___ _ 
Signature 
I further certify that I am a competent person 18 years of age or older and a resident of the state of 
service or the State of Oregon, and that I am not a party to nor an office, director or employee of, 
nor attorney for any party, corporate or otherwise; that the person, firm or corporation served by me 
is the identical person, firm or corporation named in he action. 
Type or Print arne 
2340 , 5til SJ-tY G ,'.:.cscf&e; 
Address 
2?.3Q1 Phone:37/-/L55 
PROOF OF SERVICE MARK G. OBERT 
Attorney at Law 
1740 Liberty St. SE 
Salem, OR 97302 
(503) 375-6278 
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v 
2 
2,6 
Appellant, Ted Jay Adamson, p~rsua~t Rule 24 of the ~ta~ 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits this Appeal Brief. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code 'mnotat:eci § -7 t;-2a-~ \L:) 1h1. r1e o::::::-J.e:: appealed fran - -, 
f1nal order dlsposing of all claims of al~ ~art:1es. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
does not have jurisdiction and authority to modify the property 
awara in the partles' Decree of Dlvorce? 
Did the trial court commit an error of law in failing to 
disti~ ish t~a~ the benefits Pespondent lS currentl\· receivinc 
than retirement benefits awarded in the decree? 
S~ANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law 
conclusions for correctness and to determine whether there has 
court"s legal cCJnclusior:s. Barber Farmers Ins. Exc::, """'t: 
248 (Utah Ct App. 1988); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1989)" 
1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The determinative statutory authority for this appeal is 
Utah Code Annotated§ 30-3-5(3). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of Case 
This appeal is from a final order of the Second Judicial 
District Court, Honorable Jon M. Memmott granting the 
Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment on Respondent's Petition 
To Modify Decree of Divorce. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered by 
the Second District Court on November 30, 1992. On January 29, 
1998 Respondent filed a petition to modify the award of 
retirement benefits based upon Respondent's severe disability 
sustained subsequent to entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 
56(c) of Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure. 
3. Disposition in the Lower Court 
The court granted Petitioner's motion for summary judgment, 
ruling that, as a matter of law, Respondent was not entitled to 
modification of the Decree. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
entered by the Second District Court or: U vember 30, 19>:::. ~he 
'-~~cree of Div :::e was based upon a Stinu1ation and Propertv 
Settlement Agreement signed by the arties. (Paragraph 
Statement of Fac~s of Respondent's Memorand~m In Opposi~io~ To 
Mo .·. 1mmary JudgJ 
-~~ the Decree the Petitioner was avJarded a one-half 
(1/2) interest ~~Respondent's retirement benefits accrued d~~l-~ 
· · e marriage. h 2, Staterree ts of Respo " 
Memorandur: 1 Opposition To Net Jon For Summar J;;dgment) . 
3 . the time o· --·. :-ce, the Rec;;,::;r:dent was 42 years 
old Cl .. ad worked as a licensed D1urnber. (Paragraoh j, Statement of 
Fac~s of Respondent's Memorandum :n Opposition T Motion For 
·mmary Judgn · 
4. At :.c t~me of the divorce, ·te Respondent did 
contemplate drawing on l. :e~lrement pension funa un~ll he 
rec:.i.;::eci at 6~~ years of aqe. (i?araqraph 4, Statement of Facts of 
Respondent's emoranclu:r In Opposi t.::.on ~ ~· tion For Summary 
.dgment) 
5. On --'--i :.., 1995, Respondent, v:Ll.;.;:; ·,.,rorking, fe~.:.. :_w::;, 
3 
stories onto cement and sustained a serious spinal cord injury. 
Respondent does not have the use of his legs and is confined to a 
wheel chair. The Respondent also has only limited use of his 
arms. The Respondent is no longer capable of employment and is no 
longer able to earn sufficient income to maintain his basic 
living expenses. (Paragraph 5, Statement of Facts of Respondent's 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment) 
6. In February, 1996, as a result of his disability, the 
Respondent qualified for early payments from his retirement and 
pension funds. He has been receiving $578.00 per month from the 
Utah Pipe Trades Pension Trust Fund and $610.00 per month from 
the Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund. These payments 
will be made to the Respondent for the rest of his life. The 
Respondent also is receiving Social Security disability payments. 
(Paragraph 6, Statements of Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In 
Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment) 
7. Had it not been for Respondent's unfortunate injuries, 
the Respondent would not have been eligible to receive retirement 
benefits from his retirement pension funds until he reached 62 
years of age. (Paragraph 7, Statement of Facts, Respondent's 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment) 
4 
8. Prior to the accident, the Respondent was earning 
$3,000.00 to $4,000.00 per month. (Paragraph 8, Statement of 
Facts of Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For 
Summary Judgment) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary Judgment should be granted only when the evidence, 
considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The lower court granted Petitioner's motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that, as a matter of law, it could not 
modify the property award to exclude Respondent's disability 
payments from distribution in the Decree of Divorce. Hence, 
Respondent never even got to the question of whether there had 
been a change of circumstance since entry of the decree. The 
trial court simply ruled it did not have authority. 
The applicable statute is clear that courts have continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes in divorce decrees for 
the distribution of property. Moreover, the benefits that the 
Respondent is currently receiving are disability benefits 
and as such are not marital property subject to distribution in 
5 
the decree. It is submitted that the lower court erred in 
granting Petitioner's motion for summary judgment and that as a 
matter of law, the lower court has continuing jurisdiction to 
modify the Decree of Divorce as requested by the Respondent. As 
such the case should be remanded for a determination on the 
threshold question as to whether there has been a substantial and 
material change of circumstance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BASIS FOR REVIEW 
Summary Judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). In the 
case at hand, the district court ruled that it did not, as a 
matter of law, have the authority to modify the property division 
in the decree, as requested by Respondent. The Respondent 
contends the district court does have continuing 
jurisdiction to modify property awards, to include the retirement 
annuity. 
6 
POINT II 
THE COURT HAS CONTINUTNG JURISDICTION TO MODIFY PROVISIONS IN A 
DECREE OF DIVORCE REGARDING DIVSION OF PROPERTY 
Case law, as well as state statute authorizes a court to 
modify property distributions. Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(3) provides 
as follows: 
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health and dental care and for distribution of 
the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. (emphasis added). 
A trial court may modify the division of property in a 
stipulated divorce decree under a showing of a substantial change 
of circumstances since entry of the decree and not contemplated 
in the decree itself Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct App 
1990); Williams v. Sherwood, 688 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1984); 
Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.d 181 (Utah 1981) (reallocation of 
property rights in installment payments of income from real 
property) . 
In McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979), the 
Supreme Court stated the following 
Under Utah law, a trial court granting a Decree of 
Divorce is afforded considerable discretion in the area 
of property distribution . . . the court has continuing 
jurisdiction over the parties with regard to the 
7 
decree, enabling it to make subsequent modifications as 
are equitable. The breadth of discretionary power given 
the trial court in the initial determination of the 
property division extends in equal measure to these 
subsequent modifications. 
In other cases the Utah Supreme Court has stated that, while 
the court has continuing jurisdiction to modify property 
settlements, such should be resorted to with "great reluctance 
and for compelling reasons". Land v. Land 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 
(Utah 1980); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse supra at 61. 
In Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, the trial court modified the 
distribution of equity in the marital home and timing of pay out 
of a retirement program. 
In the present case, at the time of entry of the decree, the 
parties were contemplating that Petitioner would begin receiving 
her share of Respondent's retirement benefits only when the 
Respondent reached 62 years of age, the age when Respondent could 
begin receiving retirement benefits under his retirement plan. 
The parties did not contemplate any other circumstance wherein 
Respondent would begin receiving benefits from his retirement 
pension funds prior to Respondent reaching 62 years of age. The 
decree is silent on this issue. The Respondent's injuries 
subsequent to entry of the Decree were not contemplated by the 
decree. The Respondent's severe and debilitating injuries 
represent a substantial change in circumstances from the 
circumstances that existed at the time the decree was entered. In 
8 
addition, Respondent's injuries represent a compelling reason for 
the decree to be modified to provide for the circumstance that 
the parties now find themselves in. 
POINT III 
THE BENEFITS THAT THE RESPONDENT IS CURRENTLY RECEIVING ARE 
DISABILITY BENEFITS AND ARE NOT A MARTIAL ASSET SUBJECT TO 
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The appellate courts in many states have held that 
disability payments, intended to compensate the employee for lost 
earning capacity, are not marital property subject to equitable 
distribution between the parties in a divorce. Ciliberti v. 
Ciliberti, 374 Pa.Super. 228, 542 A. 2d 580 (Pa.1988); Allard v. 
Allard, 708 A. 2d 554 (Rhode Island 1998); In ReMarriage of 
Stenquist, 21 Cal.3d 779, 148 Cal. Rptr, 9, 582 P.2d 96 (Ca. 
1978); In Re Haag, 122 Or. App 230, 857 P. 2d 208(0re. 1993); 
Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 547, 521 A. 2d 370 (Md. 1987); Avallone 
v. Avallone, 275 NJ Super.575, 646 A. 2d 112l(N.J.l994); Freeman 
v. Freeman, 468 So.2d 326 (Fla.1985); Courts have been willing 
to look behind the labels of "retirement benefits" and 
"disability benefits" to determine the true nature of the 
benefits that are received by the recipient of the benefits. 
Ciliberti v. Ciliberti, supra, Allard v. Allard, supra; Avallone 
v. Avallone, supra. Retirement benefits are generally considered 
deferred compensation for past service, and are therefore 
9 
considered to be a marital asset subject to distribution upon 
dissolution of the marriage. Knies v. Knies, 979 P. 2d 482 
(Washington 1999). In contrast, disability benefits compensate 
for lost earnings resulting from a diminished capacity to compete 
in the employment market. Allard v. Allard, supra. "Disability 
benefits may serve multiple purposes. They may compensate for the 
loss of earnings resulting from compelled premature retirement 
and from a diminished ability to compete in the employment 
market. Disability benefits may also serve to compensate the 
disabled person for personal suffering caused by the disability." 
Ciliberti v. Ciliberti, supra, at 233, quoting In Re Marriage of 
Stenquist supra, at 101. 
As such, disability benefits are the injured party's sole 
property and are not subject to distribution upon the dissolution 
of the marriage. 
Losses incurred after entry of final divorce, including 
future loss of wages, future medical expenses and 
future loss of earning capacity are the injured 
spouse's separate property and not subject to equitable 
distribution upon dissolution of the parties marriage. 
Allard vs. Allard, supra. 
In this matter, payments received by the Respondent are in 
lieu of earnings that would have been paid to him if he had been 
able to work. Therefore, the payments received by the 
Respondent are disability payments, and as such are the 
10 
Respondent's separate property and are not subject to 
distribution to the Petitioner. 
In Avallone, supra the husband had vested rights in a 
retirement pension, but had not completed the necessary years of 
service. Therefore, his right to receive the retirement pension 
had not matured. The husband was eligible for retirement 
benefits when he reached fifty five years of age, but was only 
forty four years of age when he became disabled. The court 
ruled that payments to the husband were disability benefits, and 
thus were not subject to division with the wife. 
These facts are similar to the facts in this case. 
Respondent would have been eligible to receive retirement 
benefits twenty years after the disability occurred. Therefore, 
Respondent's rights to receive retirement benefits had not yet 
matured when the disability occurred. To allow the Petitioner 
to share in the Respondent's disability benefits provides an 
unexpected windfall for the Petitioner, and a financial hardship 
for the Respondent. 
Respondent is not seeking to divest the Petitioner of her 
share in Respondent's actual retirement benefits. Respondent 
agrees that the Petitioner should share in the retirement 
benefits as contemplated by the Decree, i.e., when the 
Respondent reaches 62 years of age, and would be eligible for 
retirement benefits according to the provisions of his 
11 
retirement plan. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in granting summary judgment to 
Petitioner. As a matter of law, Respondent's disability 
benefits are not a marital asset subject to distribution with 
Petitioner. Th~refore Respondent is entitled to modify the 
Decree of Divorce to exclude Respondent's disability benefits 
from distribution in the decree of divorce. 
DATED this 2'1+~ day of June, 2000 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that the BRIEF OF APPELLANT was sent via 
First Class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this ~9+?day of June, 
2000 to the following counsel of record: 
George K. Fadel 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorney for Appellee 
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Copy of Summary Judgment Order 
George K. Fadel i1027 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
170 weat 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 295-2421 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL LYNN ADAMSON, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENYING 
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
TED JAY ADAMSON I Civil No. 9247001125 DA 
Defendant. } Judge Jon M. Memmott 
---------~~-~---------------~~~-------------·-~-~---------------
The hearing on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
denying defendant's petition for modification of decree of 
divorce, came on before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, District 
Judge, on Tuesday the 24th day of August, 1999. Plaintiff 
appeared in person and by counsel, George K. Fadel. Defendant 
appeared in person and by counsel Alan R. Stewart. The Court 
having read the memoranda filed by the parties and hearing the 
arguments of counsel, and having heretofore made and entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and it appearing that 
Summary Judgment should be entered pursuant to Rule 56, utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the pleadings, decree and other 
information contained in the record show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, now therefor: 
IT IS ORDBUD, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1 
1. The QUADRO as amended is res judicata as to the 
entitlement of the parties to retirement benefits of the 
defendant, and the Court is without jurisdiction to modify the 
QUADRO as to the plaintiff's entitlement pursuant to the Decree 
of Divorce entered in this cause. 
2. Summary Judgment is hereby entered denying the 
defendant•s motion to modify the decree of divorce. 
3 • No costs are awarded either party. 
Dated this24~day of September, 1999. 
BY TBB COURT ~ 
-=r~ro. ro ~ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
r certify that on the 26th day of Augustt 1999, I mailed 
a copy of the Findings and Judgment relating ~o the petition for 
modification of .the 'decree ·of divorce. to Mr. Alan R. Stewart, 
attorney for the defendant-respondent,l366 East Murray-Holladay 
Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. 
/ 
